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INTRODUCTION
Although their meaning and contours have long been controversial,
the general criteria for evaluating changes in tax law enjoy both stability
and consensus. At least since Adam Smith, there has been virtually uni-
versal agreement that the nation's tax law should be fair, economically
efficient, and simple to comply with and to administer. Tax law changes
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should be designed to make the law more equitable, easier to comply
with, more conducive to economic growth, and less likely to interfere
with private economic decisionmaking.
Precisely what these criteria imply for policymaking is controversial,
however. Fairness is often said to require that people with equal ability to
pay taxes pay equal amounts of tax, and those with greater ability to pay,
pay more. Disputes have long raged over the traits relevant to evaluate
whether people's circumstances are appropriately similar to warrant simi-
lar tax treatment and over the standards for evaluating peoples' relative
abilities to pay taxes. Nonetheless, a "fair" distribution of the tax burden
among people at different levels of income has long been regarded as a
necessary attribute of a just tax system, and its assessment is essential to
evaluate how a nation's tax law-or proposed changes in it-measure up.
Likewise, answers to questions regarding the economic effects of pro-
posed or enacted tax legislation are routinely disputed. Even the need to
finance budget expenditures with revenues-a seemingly straightforward
imperative-proves controversial in its execution. The pursuit of simplic-
ity is frequently a bystander. Conflict among these concerns is inevita-
ble-conflict that demands, and is reflected in, inevitable political com-
promise. Tradeoffs among these goals are the stuff from which tax
legislation is made.
As an example, in the 1981 tax legislation' horizontal equity-and
some contend vertical equity-was put aside in a quest for economic
growth.2 The 1986 Tax Reform Act3 was motivated by an effort to restore
and improve horizontal equity and to reduce the tax law's interference
with economic decisionmaking in private markets.4 In combination, the
1981 and 1986 Acts reduced the marginal tax rate at the top of the in-
come scale from seventy to twenty-eight percent. Democrats argued sub-
sequently that Republican tax policy of the 1980s favored the rich and
disadvantaged the middle class. This political attack criticized "trickle
down" economics, promising cuts to the "excessive" tax burdens on the
middle class and increases in the "inadequate" taxes on the rich. These
arguments became a central theme in the negotiations leading to the
Budget Act of 1990,5 in the 1990 mid-term elections, and in President
Clinton's 1992 campaign. They also played an important role in the en-
1. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
2. C. Eugene Steuerle, The Tax Decade: How Taxes Came to Dominate the Public
Agenda 107 (1992). For readers not familiar with the terms, horizontal equity refers to
similar treatment of people similarly situated; vertical equity refers to the fairness of the
distribution of taxes at different levels of income, consumption, or wealth.
3. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
4. See Michael J. Graetz, The Truth About Tax Reform, 40 U. Fla. L. Rev. 617, 623
(1988).
5. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388
(1990) [hereinafter OBRA 90].
[Vol. 95:609
PAINT-BY-NUMBERS TAX LA4MAKTNG
actment of the 1993 Budget Act,6 which raised the top rate to 39.6 per-
cent and narrowly passed Congress without a single Republican vote.
Perhaps most important to tax policymakers, the public seems re-
sponsive to the perceived fairness of taxes-particularly of their own tax
burdens, but also the burdens of others.7 As a practical matter, politi-
cians may be voted out of office and tax compliance may decline if taxes
are perceived by the public to be unfair. Coupled with the public's gen-
eral anti-tax attitude, press reports, congressional staff studies, and aca-
demic studies describing recent shifts in the nation's distribution of in-
come and wealth in favor of the wealthy have heightened the concerns of
both the public and their representatives with issues of tax distribution.
Public interest in distributional questions may explain why politicians of
all political stripes seem to want to argue that their policies are (or were)
progressive, thereby confirming the 1976 observation of conservative
Treasury Secretary William Simon that "[t]here appears to be widespread
consensus that an element of progression is desirable in the tax
structure."8
But Congress has not been free simply to adjust the distribution of its
constituents' taxes without taking into account budgetary pressures. Dur-
ing the past decade, the federal deficit has received substantial legislative
attention as Congress has become increasingly concerned with this issue.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 19819 was the last tax legislation
designed to reduce revenues, and every tax act after 1986 has been in-
tended to raise revenues. The Reagan Administration and Congress
agreed that the far-reaching Tax Reform Act of 1986 would be both reve-
nue and distributionally neutral; its provisions were intended neither to
increase nor reduce anticipated overall revenues nor shift the tax burden
across differing levels of income.' 0 In writing the 1986 Act, Congres-
sional staff and decisionmakers used revenue and distributional data cre-
atively to constrain and guide tax policymaking toward substantive out-
comes based on widely shared normative goals and legislative
directions."
In contrast, since 1986, virtually all significant tax legislation has
been a revenue-raising part of "Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act" leg-
islation with the principal mission of deficit containment. In both 1990
and 1993, specific deficit goals-reductions in projected five-year budget
6. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 1993
U.S.C.CAN. (107 Stat.) 312 [hereinafter OBRA 93].
7. See, e.g., Steven M. Sheffrin, What Does the Public Believe About Tax Fairness?, 46
Nat'l TaxJ. 301, 302-03 (1998).
8. Letter from Secretary of Treasury William Simon to Mrs. Llewellyn Lowe (Treas.
Doc. 76-25), summarized in Consumption Type Income Tax, Tax Notes, Dec. 27, 1976, at
11.
9. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
10. See Graetz, supra note 4, at 623-25.
11. See, e.g., Steuerle, supra note 2, at 1-2 (discussing legislative goals of lowering tax
rates and broadening income tax base, particularly through elimination of tax shelters).
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deficits by a total of $500 billion in each case-dominated the policymak-
ing process. 12 The budgetary rules of the 1990 and 1993 Acts demanded
that any revenue reducing measures be paid for either through offsetting
revenue increases or spending reductions; during consideration of both
of these Acts, Democratic majorities in Congress also insisted that tax in-
creases increase the progressivity of the federal tax system. Indeed, in
1993, President Clinton demanded, and the Democratic congressional
majority agreed, that at least seventy percent of tax increases be levied on
people with incomes of at least $100,000.13 In recent years, achieving
specific revenue and distributional numbers have become policy goals
themselves.
The political focus on balancing traditional tax policymaking con-
cerns for improving equity and economic efficiency has been
subordinated in recent legislation to reflect the overriding goal of insur-
ing specific annual revenue effects of proposed tax policy changes over
the "budget period" (generally five years, but, under the 1993 Budget
Act, ten years in some cases). For example, in the 1993 Act, personal
income taxes were made retroactive to the beginning of 1993 (with de-
ferred payments allowed for three years) solely to satisfy five-year revenue
targets. 14 In addition, sizeable penalties on marriage were enacted for
high-income taxpayers in 1993 for the sole purpose of conforming to a
specific combination of revenue and distributional targets, without violat-
ing the President's decision not to raise the top income tax rate above
forty percent.15
This increased reliance on distributional tables and revenue esti-
mates as outcome-determinative factors in tax legislation presents two
quite different problems. Although it is important to know the likely ef-
fect of proposed tax legislation on total federal finances, with regard to
revenue effects, policymakers are often asking the wrong question.
Rather than looking to the long-term or even overall effects of tax legisla-
tion on federal revenues, Congress looks only to annual revenue effects
over a five- or ten-year period. Indeed, Congress has bound itself legisla-
tively to focus on this question through statutory budgetary requirements.
12. See Budget Talks Concluded, Tax Notes Today, Oct. 1, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT File (discussing 1990 budget goals).
13. See OBRA 93, supra note 6; Senate Passes Reconciliation Bill, 50-49, Tax Notes
Today, July 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File; Tax Bill's Stiff Wedlock
Penalty Tests Limits of 'Family Values,' Tax Notes Today, July 6, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT File.
14. See OBRA 93, supra note 6, at § 13201(c) (making provisions retroactive); id. at
§ 13201(d) (allowing payment in installments).
15. See MichaelJ. Graetz, Tax Policy at the Beginning of the Clinton Administration,
10 Yale J. on Reg. 561, 569 (1993) (illustrating that tax penalty on marriage for high
income taxpayers exceeds $13,000 a year). For a discussion of the marriage penalty on
lower-income taxpayers, see Anne L Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the
Limitations on Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 533, 559-64
(1995) (demonstrating tax penalty inherent in the Earned Income Tax Credit).
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In contrast, there are no specific constraints regarding the distribution of
tax changes, and the basic distributional question being addressed is un-
questionably a proper one. In changing a tax system whose history-in-
deed its constitutional status-is grounded in notions of ability to pay, it
is obviously important for policymakers to attempt to know the distribu-
tional consequences of proposed changes. However, as with the revenue
estimates, the basis for congressional evaluation and decisionmaking re-
garding distributional issues is seriously flawed.
Congressional decisionmaking regarding both the revenue and dis-
tributional questions reveals a unitary weakness in the current tax legisla-
tive process: Congressional decisionmakers routinely suffer from illu-
sions of precision. Congress today seems to want tax policymaking to
turn on simple numerical answers, reminiscent of the supercomputer
Deep Thought, who in the science fiction classic, The Hitchhiker's Guide
to the Galaxy, revealed that the answer to the "great Question of Life, the
Universe and Everything" was "42."16 Armed with mathematical answers
to both revenue and distributional questions, tax policymakers routinely
eschew the difficulties of exercising judgment to strike an appropriate
balance among ambiguous and often conflicting normative goals; in the
process, they put aside the massive empirical uncertainties they inevitably
face. Instead, they constrain themselves to write laws that conform to mis-
leading or wrongheaded mathematical straightackets.
This Article deals in some detail with two kinds of such numbers-
distributional and revenue numbers-and how they are used and mis-
used in the tax legislative process.17 I shall consider the distributional
and revenue issues in turn. I conclude that current practices of relying
solely on five- or ten-year annual revenue estimates and of fashioning tax
legislation to achieve a particular result in a distribution table create an
illusion of precision when such precision is impossible. In reaching this
16. Douglas Adams, The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy 179-80 (1979).
17. Tax policymaking is not unique in the political or legislative process for its misuse
of numerical constructs. It has become well known, for example, that the consumer price
index (CPI) tends to overstate the impact of inflation on purchasing power, but inflation
adjustments tied to CPI changes can nevertheless be found in much legislation, including
Social Security benefits, welfare payments, and budget rules. Similarly, the main advantage
of the current povery level measure is its consistency over time. It probably was not a very
good measure of poverty when first constructed in the 1940s and surely is inadequate and
misleading today, yet legislation is routinely advanced targeting subsidies to some
percentage of this poverty level. In 1994, for example, Democrats and Republicans both
linked government subsidies for health insurance to the relationship of a family's income
to the poverty level. See Senate, House Democratic Bills at a Glance, Reuters, Aug. 9, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; U.S. Senate Republicans Unveil Their Own
Health, Reuters, Sept. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
Likewise, each year the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) publishes the amount of the
so-called "tax gap"-the amount of under-reported taxes from legal sources of income-
which is now estimated to be over $100 billion. One cannot help but wonder why, if the
IRS knows with such precision how much in taxes is being under-reported, it does not
simply collect some of this money.
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conclusion, I do not mean to embrace an easy attack on the theoretical
difficulties and limitations of data in order to conclude that nothing of
any import can or should be said. That would be palpably false. There is
much we know about the likely winners and losers from changes in tax
policy. Decisionmakers need such information and are entitled to share
in this knowledge. But current illusions of precision should be
abandoned.
This Article argues that the tax policymaking process would be far
better served by abandoning altogether the current practice of having
staffs routinely construct distributional tables for Congress and the Ad-
ministration to consider while legislation is pending in the Congress. Instead,
decisionmakers generally should be given qualitative information about
how the proposed amendments to the law will likely affect the size and
distribution of people's after-tax incomes. Quantitative estimates of the
effects of tax legislation on the distribution of taxes should be produced
periodically by the relevant tax staffs as background information for deci-
sionmakers and should take into account the variations in approaches to
specific issues that this Article discusses in detail. With regard to revenue
estimates, greater attention should be given to long-term and overall reve-
nue consequences of legislation to eliminate the current practice of struc-
turing legislation to maximize revenue gains or minimize revenue losses
within the budget period. In addition, the reliability-or lack thereof-
of these estimates should be identified for policymakers, for example, by
providing a range of likely outcomes. In the conclusion to this Article, I
provide examples of the kinds of information that should be presented to
decisionmakers and describe why I believe such a change would improve
the tax decisionmaking process.
I. THE RELEVANT STAFFS
Policymakers in the Congress and Administration routinely receive
two sets of tables that recently have been outcome-determinative in the
legislative drafting process: revenue tables, which estimate anticipated an-
nual revenue effects of each proposed change over the following five or
ten years, and distributional tables, which purport to reflect the antici-
pated distribution among income classes of proposed changes in the tax
law. The computer revolution permits new tables reflecting new policy
options to be generated in a matter of hours. When different political
parties are in control at the White House and in Congress, the political
contest over the "relevant facts" sometimes results in dueling tables from
the Administrative and Congressional staffs. In recent years, as legislation
has progressed through the lawmaking process, these revenue tables have
often dominated legislative decisionmaking and the distributional tables
have become Congress's sole basis for evaluating the vertical equity of
proposed legislation.
Generally, politicians get their revenue and tax distributional infor-
mation from three staffs of experts: the staffs of the Joint Committee on
[Vol. 95:609
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Taxation (JCT), the Congressi6nal Budget Office (CBO), and the Treas-
ury's Office of Tax Analysis (OTA). JCT, which was established in 1926,
has long served as the principal technical staff to the tax-writing commit-
tees of the Congress. For many years, JOT was the only substantive tax
staff for these committees, but today both the House Ways and Means
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee have majority and minor-
ity staffs which specialize in tax matters. JCT is the official scorekeeper
the Congress for revenue estimates; it also provides the tax-writing com-
mittees with tables reflecting its estimates of distributional changes of
pending legislation.
The Joint Committee on Taxation has long been extremely influen-
tial in the tax legislative process. Its chiefs of staff have typically enjoyed
great respect among Congressional members of both political parties.
Only three people served as JCT Chief of Staff during its first fifty years
from 1926 to 1976. Since the late 1970s, however, staff proliferation and
turnover has diffused JCT's power and influence. JCT has had six differ-
ent staff chiefs during the period 1977-1994. The 1970s marked the be-
ginning of a great expansion of the number of people, particularly con-
gressional staff, involved in the tax lawmaking process. Tax specialists
began taking positions as minority and majority staff members of the tax-
writing committees, diminishing substantially the influence of the staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation.
In 1974, Congress completely revised its processes for enacting
budget legislation. Budget committees were established in both the
House and Senate, and the Congressional Budget Office was created to
serve the new budget committees. Each year these committees propose a
budget resolution, which then is taken up by the House and Senate and
ultimately combined into ajoint budget resolution. Thisjoint resolution
specifies the amounts to be spent for various categories of expenditures
and the amount of revenue to be raised; the resolution also instructs the
tax-writing committees to produce legislation meeting certain revenue
targets. Both the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Fi-
nance Committee are bound to comply with these resolutions. If a legis-
lative proposal fails'to do so, any member can raise a point of order in
objection, and such objections can only be overridden by special voting
rules.' 8
The Congressional Budget Office is a creature of the 1974 Budget
Act. CBO reports to the Budget Committees of the House and Senate.' 9
CBO is the official scorekeeper for Congress on spending and technical
budget issues-a recent example was the federal budgetary treatment of
18. In the 1980s and 1990s, these budget rules were further constrained by the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation, see Public Debt Limit-Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985), and the
Budget Enforcement Acts, see OBRA 90, supra note 5 and OBRA 93, supra note 6.
19. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
344, §§ 201-202, 88 Stat. 297, 302-05 (1974).
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various health reform proposals-and CBO often publishes analyses of
recently enacted tax legislation or issues pending before the Congress.
CBO is responsible for estimating federal government spending, changes
in spending in connection with appropriations and budget legislation,
and total annual receipts of the federal government for each year of the
five- or ten-year budget period. However, it does not estimate the reve-
nue consequences of specific legislative tax proposals, nor does it nor-
mally produce distributional tables for members of Congress to consider
during legislative deliberations. Nevertheless, in connection with the
1990 Budget Act negotiations, CBO did produce distributional tables of
legislative proposals, presumably at the request of the Democratic Con-
gressional leadership or chairmen of the House and Senate Budget
committees.
In combination, JCT and CBO estimates of spending, receipts, and
revenues are critical in the legislative process. Under both the House and
the Senate rules, these estimates determine whether proposed legislation
violates the rules of the governing Budget Act, thereby becoming poten-
tially subject to a point of order.20 If a budget point of order applies,
supermajority votes-for example, sixty of the one hundred Senators-
are necessary to waive or override the point of order and take up the
legislation on its merits.
Since the beginning of the federal income tax in 1913, the Secretary
of the Treasury has had at least one economist whose principal function
was to provide analysis and advice on tax policy matters. Over time, the
responsibility for tax policy advice within the Treasury Department has
come to reside in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy.
Both the economists and lawyers in that office are involved in legislative
analysis, with the lawyers principally responsible for drafting legislation
and writing regulations and the economists responsible for analyses of
the economic aspects of tax policy proposals. These economists comprise
the Treasury's Office of Tax Analysis (OTA), which reports to the Secre-
tary of Treasury through the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy. OTA is
the Administration's official estimator of total budget receipts and antici-
pated revenue effects of proposed legislative changes. OTA also routinely
provides the Administration's decisionmakers with distributional and an-
alytical analyses of tax proposals and legislation. Sometimes OTA's distri-
butional tables are used by members of Congress during the formulation
of legislation, but theJCT tables have dominated the legislative process in
recent years.2 ' OTA's revenue estimates, on the other hand, play a criti-
cal role in the legislative process, since under the 1990 and 1993 Budget
Acts the Administration's official revenue estimates-not those of CBO
20. See OBRA 90, supra note 5, at § 13207 (points of order); id. at § 13214 ("Byrd
rule" allowing points of order to be raised against extraneous matters in budget
reconcilation bills).
21. For example, JCT distribution tables were the only tables used by Congressional
decisionmakers in both the 1990 and 1993 legislation.
[Vol. 95:609
PAINT-BY-NUMBERS TAX LAVWIAKING
orJCT-determine whether automatic spending reductions, so-called se-
questration, take effect.2 2
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is the executive
branch's counterpart to the CBO. OMB is responsible for estimating
spending and is nominally responsible for estimating total receipts and
revenue effects of legislation, but the substance of these latter two tasks is
assigned to OTA. OMB simply takes OTA estimates of receipts and reve-
nues and incorporates them into OMB official publications and esti-
mates. Unlike CBO, OMB does not perform its own analyses of tax legis-
lation or tax policy proposals.
As this brief review suggests, both OTA and JCT revenue estimates
are of critical importance in the legislative process, with JCT estimates
determining whether a congressional point of order is permissible and
OTA estimates determining whether sequestration is required. JCT dis-
tributional tables have recently been most significant. Data produced by
these staffs are often reconfigured, explained, and sometimes contested
by other congressional staffs, the media, and private analysts. Recently,
JCT has revised certain important aspects of its standard distributional
analyses.23 Staff members from both OTA and CBO have also outlined
their (somewhat different) methodologies. 2 4
II. DisTiBUTIONAL TABLEs
The distributional data produced by these three government staffs
are of two general types, only one of which is particularly troublesome.
First, each staff from time to time publishes distributional data as part of
an analysis of various kinds of tax issues. For example, CBO frequently
publishes analyses of changes over time in the distribution of after-tax
incomes, the distributional impact of recently-enacted tax legislation, of
the tax system as a whole, or of specific tax provisions. Two recent exam-
ples are its analyses of the Revenue Act of 1993 and the exclusion from
22. See OBRA 90, supra note 5, at § 13101; OBRA 93, supra note 6, at § 14003.
23. See Staff of theJoint Comm. on Taxation, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., Methodology and
Issues in Measuring Changes in the Distribution of Tax Burdens (Comm. Print 1993)
[hereinafter JCT, Measuring Tax Burdens 1993]; Thomas A. Barthold & William Jack,
Joint Committee on Taxation, Summary of the Joint Committee on Taxation Distribution
Methodology passim (1993).
24. See Distributional Analysis of Tax Policy (David F. Bradford, American Enterprise
Institute ed., forthcoming September 1995); Susan C. Nelson, Family Economic Income
and Other Income Concepts Used in Analyzing Tax Reform, Tax Notes Today, Jan. 28,
1988, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, Taxtxt File; Richard A. Kasten, Congressional
Budget Office, CBO's Method for Simulating the Distribution of Combined Federal Taxes
Using Census, Tax-Return, and Expenditure Microdata, State Tax Notes, Nov. 19, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Sttax Library, Stn File.
Private and academic economists have also demonstrated great interest in the
distribution of taxes. See, e.g., Don Fullerton & Diane L. Rogers, Who Bears the Lifetime
Tax Burden? (1993);Joseph A. Pechman, Who Paid the Taxes, 1966-1985? (1985);Joseph
A. Pechman & Benjamin A. Okner, Who Bears the Tax Burden? (1974).
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income of employer-provided health benefits. 25 Likewise, the Treasury
annually publishes an analysis of taxes paid by higher-income taxpayers. 26
While these documents may have more force in the legislative arena than
private or academic analyses of distributional issues, they are essentially
designed to serve similar functions: namely, to provide ongoing informa-
tion and analysis of significant tax policy issues.
A second and more problematic use of distributional tables is that by
policymakers during legislative drafting and deliberation. When tax legis-
lation is being considered by the committees, distributional tables are re-
viewed by policymakers who are deliberating and deciding the shape and
detail of legislation being considered. 27 As tentative decisions are made,
new distributional tables reflecting the tentative new decisions are often
produced, typically by JOT but sometimes by OTA as well. To serve this
function, these tables must be produced and revised quickly, often in a
matter of hours. Members of Congress are not especially responsive to
staff requests for additional time for analysis. For example, in both 1990
and 1993, important legislative decisions were taken to achieve certain
results in JCT's distributional tables (as well as to meet specific revenue
targets), and the 1986 Tax Reform Act was constrained to be distribution-
ally (as well as revenue) neutral.28 This means that as legislation is being
crafted, changes are made in the specifics of the legislation, or proposals
are added or dropped, to make the distributional tables "come out right."
As Mickey Kaus has put it, "distributional charts ... have elevated the
'details of the counting-house' into the sine qua non of justice and
'fairness.'" 29
Given the limits of time, inadequacies of data, and important theo-
retical conundrums, what kind of data should be provided by staffs to best
25. See Congressional Budget Office, An Economic Analysis of the Revenue
Provisions of OBRA-93 (1994); Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Tax
Exclusion of Employer-Provided Health Benefits (1994).
26. See, e.g., Statistics of Income Division, Internal Revenue Service, Individual
Income Tax Returns 1988, 67-92 (1991).
27. For an example of such a table, see Table 1, infra at 628.
28. In the presence of ambiguity, politicians will, of course, often also want to know
how most effectively to respond to factual claims by their political adversaries. Given the
nature of my enterprise here, I can simply assume that each staff regards its mission in each
of these contexts as providing the best information possible to the politicians who have
decisionmaking responsibilities. I can also simply assume here that political
decisionmakers want to be as well informed as possible in order to decide whether to
support or oppose alternative policies. This assumption provides the best context in which
to frame the issues to be discussed in this paper, although we are not obliged to be
pollyannish in evaluating the judgments I offer here. We all know that there are times
when immediate political advantage is of greater import to a politician than "good" policy,
although we might have differing views about the frequency of those occasions. We can
also admit that there may be moments when the purveyor of the information might be
pursuing her own policy agenda, rather than simply informing the decisionmaker to the
best of her abilities. But let us put aside for now questions of potential misuse of
information or abuse of position.
29. Mickey Kaus, The End of Equality 22 (1992).
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inform decisionmakers? Are the distributional tables of the sort now rou-
tinely provided the most appropriate kind of information? Should the
politicians' distributional questions be answered in the manner econo-
mists or moral philosophers regard as the best? In these circumstances,
where representatives selected through democratic processes are impos-
ing social obligations on the citizenry, how, if at all, should the public's
intuitions and ability to understand complex information constrain the
process? If this Article does nothing more, it should prove these ques-
tions to be difficult enough.
I shall approach this issue by examining limitations inherent in the
staffs' ability to provide precise noncontroversial answers to distributional
questions. To begin this inquiry, I briefly examine a somewhat old-fash-
ioned theoretical economic consensus about how best to illuminate distri-
butional issues. This inquiry should illustrate some aspects of distribution
that are buried in seemingly precise summary measures. For the uniniti-
ated, this should put more flesh on the distributional issue itself. I then
explore some significant areas where the different staffs disagree over an-
swers to specific questions necessary to construct distributional tables.
Then I describe areas of staff agreement where the consensus hides po-
tentially important information.
A. Impossible Goals and Impractical Tasks
Thoughtful economists have long known that it is impossible to as-
sess precisely the effects of government policies on the distribution of
income and wealth. In his excellent public finance treatise, Carl Shoup
describes the problem:
To say, for example, that households with before-tax incomes
between $2,000 and $5,000 pay 12 percent of that income in
taxes, directly and indirectly, is to make a statement that is with-
out significance because it is conceptually invalid. It is concep-
tually invalid because it postulates, for implicit comparison, a
state of affairs in which there are no taxes whatever, and no gov-
ernment borrowing or creation of new money, hence impliedly
no government services, not even of the minimum type and
amount necessary to assure existence of the society.... [This]
objection is conclusive.3 0
Shoup's basic point is quite telling. The most interesting ques-
tions-the overall effects of government action (or even of one level of
government, say the federal government) on the distribution of in-
come-are impossible to evaluate, even in principle. This is because the
point for comparison, namely, the distribution of income absent any gov-
ernment, is unknowable, indeed unimaginable. But attempting to quan-
tify this impossible answer is the daily bread of the tax policy staffs of the
Congress and the Treasury. The first two columns of the standard distri-
30. Carl S. Shoup, Public Finance 577-78 (1969).
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butional tables prepared routinely by CBO, JCT and OTA purport to
show the amount of taxes and average tax rates paid currently by people
at different levels of income.31 Indeed, virtually everyone who analyzes
the distribution of tax burdens and estimates the effects of proposed
changes begins at this same "conceptually invalid" place-with an esti-
mate of the distribution of the existing tax burden. The fundamental
questions that are raised by these estimates are simply never asked; the
extent to which government policies have affected the amount of income
earned by the people who are being evaluated in such tables is buried, as
it must be. This means that the least controversial aspect of the table-the
snapshot of conditions as they supposedly exist before any policy changes
are considered-is itself constructed on quicksand.
Of course, it is neither "conceptually invalid" nor without meaning
to inquire whether a change in tax (or other government) policy is likely
to make the distribution of after-tax income or wealth more equal or
more unequal. 32 To the contrary, this question is frequently essential
and often answerable, at least in a general way, with a high degree of
confidence. For example, it should not be controversial to say that a shift
from a progressive personal income tax to a flat rate consumption tax
would tend to make the after-tax distribution of income more unequal.
But it is the way in which answers to such questions are presented to deci-
sionmakers for evaluating changes in policy that is troublesome.
B. Where Has Cni Gone?
Traditionally, economists agreed about the proper way, at least as a
matter of theory, to measure the distributional effects of changes in the
tax law: the magnitude of each unit's after-tax income is determined
before and after the revision of the tax law and the results are compared.
To determine whether a tax change increased or reduced income ine-
quality and to depict these effects graphically, economists typically have
constructed two Lorenz curves 33-one before the change, the other af-
ter-then compared their Gini coefficients.3 4
A Lorenz curve arranges the population from the poorest to the rich-
est along the horizontal axis and the percentages of income enjoyed by
various percentages of the population along the vertical axis. Zero per-
cent of the population will always be shown as having zero percent of the
income and 100% of the population will always have 100% of the income.
In this construction, if everyone has the same income the Lorenz curve
will be a diagonal straight line. Whenever the poor have proportionally
less income than the rich-the common state of affairs-the Lorenz
curve stretches below the diagonal with its slope typically rising as one
31. See Table 1, infra at 628.
32. See Shoup, supra note 30, at 578-79.
33. See M.O. Lorenz, Methods of Measuring Concentration of Wealth, 9 Publications
of the Am. Stat. Ass'n 209 (1905).
34. See Corrado Gini, VariabilitA e Mutabilitad [Variability and Mutability] (1912).
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moves from poorer to richer segments of the population. Figure I depicts
a typical Lorenz curve:
FiGuRE 1
100
Percentage
of
Income
0 Percentage of population
If the Lorenz curve after a tax revision lies entirely between the diag-
onal and the pre-enactment Lorenz curve, the tax change will have made
the distribution of income relatively more equal. With the introduction
of an effective progressive income tax, which imposes a higher share of
taxes as pre-tax income rises, post-tax income would be more equally dis-
tributed than pre-tax income, presumably for every segment of the popu-
lation (assuming that the tax does not result in a reorganization of the
orderings of pre-tax income levels). Such an outcome is shown in Figure
2.
FIGURE 2
Percentage of Population
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In contrast, a proportional income tax should preserve relative differ-
ences in pre-tax income, resulting in an unchanged Lorenz curve and, on
this criterion at least, a distributionally neutral outcome.
Of course, comparing Lorenz curves tells nothing about absolute
levels of income, only relative shares. There is no way to tell from these
curves alone how much lower (or higher) the levels of income are before
and after the tax change. Moreover, a universally equality-enhancing re-
sult of the sort depicted in Figure 2 is by no means inevitable from a
change in policy. In addition, if the Lorenz curve after the change
crosses the one before the change, simply eyeballing the graphs will tell
little. What seems to be needed is some index number to identify
whether relative inequality has been increased or decreased. This is
where Gini came in.
A Gini coefficient quantifies how far an income distribution is from
the diagonal (the equal distribution of incomes) by measuring the area
between the diagonal and a given Lorenz curve as a fraction of the total
area under the diagonal. This fraction will always be between zero and
one, with zero representing an equal distribution (a Lorenz curve along
the diagonal) and one representing maximum inequality. Lower Gini co-
efficients signal more equal distributions of income. Since a Gini coeffi-
cient can always be calculated for any Lorenz curve, Gini permits a com-
plete ranking of income distributions regardless of the shapes or
intersections of the Lorenz curves being compared. This comprehensive
ordering quality is useful and no doubt accounts for some substantial
measure of Gini's longstanding popularity. Any transfer from a richer to
a poorer person will always reduce the value of the Gini coefficient. More-
over, the Gini coefficient will remain unchanged if everyone's income is
lowered (or raised) in the same proportion. Thus, a progressive income
tax would lower the Gini coefficient and a proportional income tax would
leave it unchanged.3 5
35. Gini coefficients and other measures of income inequality can be used in a variety
of ways. The text, for example, discusses Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients in comparing
pre-tax and post-tax Ginis and also in comparing post-tax Ginis before and after a change
in the tax law. Changes in tax laws may produce changes in pre-tax incomes, which, in
principle at least, might be captured by comparing pre-tax Ginis before and after the
change, although observed changes in pre-tax income may be due to a variety of other
factors. For example, relatively greater incomes earned by educated people clearly made
pre-tax distribution of income more unequal during the 1980s. Changes in tax law also
might change the relationship of pre-tax and post-tax income curves. Quantifying this
effect is somewhat more difficult; one way to do so would be to examine the difference
between pre-tax minus post-tax Ginis before the change and pre-tax minus post-tax Gini's
after the change. Keeping all of this straight requires close scrutiny, and politicians often
blur the various elements. Throughout the 1980s, Republicans, for example, often pointed
to the increased share of income taxes paid by higher-income taxpayers during the period
following the 1981 Tax Act, but this could have occurred as a result of higher shares of pre-
tax income, even if the tax law had become less progressive. The relative shares of pre-tax
income might or might not have been connected to the tax change. Some would argue
that pre-tax incomes of upper-income taxpayers grew because people responded to lower
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However, the ethical and normative force of the Gini coefficient has
been questioned.3 6 Although transfers from richer to poorer people will
always reduce the Gini coefficient, changes in Gini coefficients turn on
the number of people between the income levels of the redistribution
without regard to the differing levels of income.3 7 The important point
of these criticisms has been to expand the numbers and kinds of meas-
ures of inequality in the literature,s s to demonstrate the normative com-
plexity of the concept of inequality, and to suggest the controversy-or,
on the contrary, the closed-mindedness-of relying on any single mea-
sure of inequality.3 9 Nevertheless, economic treatments of income distri-
bution issues continue to accord Gini a prominent place.4°
I have been unable to find any occasion on which OTA orJCT has
published Gini coefficients for proposed or enacted tax laws. Perhaps
they have rejected this idea because of the difficulties with Gini noted
above. Another possible reason-that neither the populace nor their
elected representatives would have any idea what a Gini coefficient is or
means-while perhaps true, seems unlikely. These staffs' regular busi-
ness is translating difficult and obscure legal and economic concepts to
make them understandable to politicians, and Gini coefficients or other
such measures of the effects of tax changes on the after-tax distribution of
income do not seem to pose any unique problems in this regard. Indeed,
the CBO has published studies that include estimates of Gini coefficients
to evaluate the relative progressivity of legislation of 1977, 1981, and
1984.4 1 This is not CRO's standard procedure for analyzing the distribu-
tion of tax changes, however. In its 1992 Economic Report of the Presi-
dent, the Council of Economic Advisors, while emphasizing that they
present an incomplete picture, also set forth Gini coefficients of U.S. fam-
tax rates by working harder and foregoing tax-sheltered income. Others would contend
that higher returns to education prompted the increase and that upper-income people
received more pay for the same work as the economy became more global and less
regulated.
36. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, On Economic Inequality 31-39 (1973); Anthony B.
Atkinson, On the Measurement of Inequality, 2J. Econ. Theory 244, 261-62 (1970).
37. See Sen, supra note 36, at 32-34.
38. See Atkinson, supra note 36, at 257 (describing social welfare function approach).
39. See Sen, supra note 36.
40. See, e.g., Alissa Goodman & Steven Webb, For Richer, For Poorer. The Changing
Distribution of Income in the United Kingdom, 1961-1991 (Institute for Fiscal Studies
Commentary No. 42) (1994) (using various measures, including Gini coefficients, to
describe changes in overall income inequality and living standards in the United Kingdom
between 1961 and 1991); PeterJ. Lambert, The Distribution and Redistribution of Income:
A Mathematical Analysis (forthcoming Oct. 1995);J. Richard Aronson & PeterJ. Lambert,
Decomposing the Gini Coefficient to Reveal the Vertical, Horizontal and Reranking Effects
of Income Taxation, 47 Nat'l Tax J. 273 (1994) (disaggregating Gini coefficients to
determine effect of taxes on unequal treatment of people similarly situated, differential
treatment of people differently situated, and effect in making ranking of people different
post-tax than it was pre-tax).
41. See Congressional Budget Office, The Changing Distribution of Federal Taxes:
1975-1990 (1987).
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ily income for the period 1947-1991. The report showed relatively grad-
ual increases in Gini-less equality of incomes-during the period
1968-1990.42 Such shifts in the distribution of income over time are, of
course, only partly due to changes in the tax law; market forces and
other government actions may be far more important.43
It is well beyond my task here to rehearse or comment on the spe-
cific debates that have occurred. Rather, my purposes have been princi-
pally two: First, to introduce uninitiated readers to the subject of Lorenz
curves and Gini coefficients in order to illustrate some of the issues and
difficulties that can lie behind what may appear to be precise compari-
sons of different income distributions. Each of the measures used makes
controversial choices about what information to include and about how
to depict comparisons or changes over time. Second, this discussion
demonstrates that the effects of relevant government policies on the dis-
tribution of after-tax income have historically concerned economists and
others who have analyzed income distributional issues outside the legisla-
tive arena.. Ultimately, it is the impact of legislation on the distribution of
after-tax incomes that should be of concern in analyzing the distribu-
tional consequences of legislative changes, although the effects of legisla-
tion on after-tax income will often take considerable time to occur, and,
in many cases, will be unknowable. Regardless of the difficulties with the
mechanisms for quantifying and comparing different policy proposals,
however, the focus on after-tax incomes remains an extremely useful
baseline for evaluating the questions I raise here. As will become clear in
the following section, however, distributional tables, particularly those
prepared by JCT, often stray rather far from even attempting to answer
this question. I am confident, however, that policymakers often do not
realize that the distributional tables they are using address quite a differ-
ent question.
C. Staff Disagreements in Constructing Distributional Tables
1. Distributing Changes in Taxes vs. Changes in "Burden". - Since vir-
tually every normative measure (including Gini coefficients and Lorenz
curves) of changes in income distributions expected from or due to
changes in government policies is based upon comparisons of after-tax
incomes, it is only natural to assume that distributional tables reflect the
staffs' best estimates of who will bear tax (revenue) increases or pay re-
duced taxes due to tax law changes. Although this assumption is gener-
ally true for OTA, JCT and CBO distribute the changes in tax revenue
that would result if no one changed behavior in response to the change
in the tax law.
42. See Council of Economic Advisors, The Economic Report of the President,
123-34 (1992); see also Goodman & Webb, supra note 40, at 11-12 (setting forth Gini
coefficients showing sustained period of increasing income inequality in United Kingdom
during the period 1977-1991).
43. See Sen, supra note 36, at 22.
[Vol. 95:609
PAiNT-B Y-NUM3ERS TAX LAWMAKING
To understand JCT and CBO methodology-which has recently
been and may well continue to be of great importance in the political
process-it is necessary to understand how theJCT distributional analysis
differs from its estimates of revenue effects of changes in tax policy.4 As
I discuss further in Part III, in estimating the revenue effects of tax
changes, JCT and CBO take into account their predictions of the behav-
ioral responses of people affected by the tax (including consumers,
producers, and suppliers of capital and labor). For both distributional
and revenue estimates, the three agencies hold constant major
macroeconomic variables (such as the level of GDP, aggregate cash and
non-cash wages, corporate profits, interest rates, and assumptions of infla-
tion) .45 It is useful to think of these revenue calculations as occurring in
two stages: JCT, CBO, and OTA first estimate the revenue gain or loss
that would occur if behavior were unchanged-the cognoscenti call this
the "static revenue change"-and then estimate any offset to the static
revenue estimate due to peoples' behavioral responses.
In constructing their distributional tables, however, JCT and CBO
are interested in the distribution of changes in economic well-being-
which they label tax "burdens"-rather than changes in taxes paid, and
use only the static revenue change in measuring the change in tax bur-
dens to be distributed across income classes. JCT and CBO only dis-
tribute the static line in estimating changes in economic burden. JCT
and CBO choose to ignore behavioral effects, justifying their exclusion as
necessary "to present meaningful estimates of the change in well-be-
ing."46 Thus, voluntary behavioral shifts and any additional taxes which
accompany them are ignored by JCT and CBO in producing tables re-
flecting changes in the economic burdens of tax legislation.
The decision ofJCT and CBO to use the static revenue estimate as a
measure of the changes in economic burden is based on a straightfor-
ward argument. To the extent that increases in the actual taxes paid are
due to behavioral changes, such as a voluntary increase in the behavior
44. See JaT, Measuring Tax Burdens 1993, supra note 23, at 26-29.
45. The relevant macroeconomic variables are given toJCT by CBO, which uses them
in its general budget estimates. OTA follows the same practice for revenue estimates,
except that the macroeconomic variables are supplied by the so-called Troika (the Council
of Economic Advisers, the Office of Management and Budget, and Treasury's Assistant
Secretary for Economic Policy). Thus, for example, in estimating the revenue effects of
the income tax rate increases enacted in 1993, JCT took into account likely shifts of
investments of high-income people to purchases of tax-exempt bonds or to other tax-
favored investments, for example, by substituting low dividend, high capital gain stocks for
high dividend stocks, but it did not take into account the macroeconomic impact on GDP
or total wages. See Staff ofJoint Comm. on Taxation, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., Discussion of
Revenue Estimation Methodology and Process 6-11 (Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafterjCT,
Revenue Estimation 1992]. Likewise, in estimating the revenue effects from President
Clinton's 1994 proposal for a one dollar increase in the tobacco tax, the JC. and OTA
took into account their estimates of how many people would quit or reduce smoking in
response to the tax increase.
46. JCT, Measuring Tax Burdens 1993, supra note 23, at 28-29.
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that is to be taxed, the voluntary increases in the taxes paid must have
been at least equaled or exceeded by some other benefit; otherwise, the
change in behavior would not have occurred. In the case of decreases in
tax rates, voluntary increases in the behavior subject to the tax reduction
are therefore ignored. Likewise, in the case of an increase in tax rates,
offsetting reductions in revenue due to behavioral responses reflect
changes that taxpayers would have preferred not to have made absent the
tax increase. This means that, in such cases, the static revenue estimate
overstates the change in burden, and the dynamic revenue estimate un-
derstates the change in burden.
AsJCT explicitly acknowledges, the decision to estimate burdens us-
ing the static revenue estimate has certain systematic effects; it "overesti-
mates the loss of economic well-being due to a tax increase, and under-
states the progressive improvement in economic well-being due to a tax
reduction."47 In other words, when tax decreases are translated into
economists' measures of "welfare gains and losses," the static revenue loss
represents a minimum of the "welfare gain" because the behavioral
changes that are ignored would occur only if they also added to the per-
son's welfare; in contrast, static revenue gains from tax increases typically
reflect the maximum welfare loss, because people's behavioral responses
will be undertaken for the purpose of reducing the welfare losses that
would otherwise occur. If one regards the key distributional question as
the effect of the tax change on the distribution of after-tax income, JCT's
practice of distributing static revenue change overstates the burden of tax
increases and understates the effect on welfare of tax reductions. 48
Notwithstanding the measurement difficulties, theJGT distribution meth-
odology is intended to be an easy and feasible approximation of changes
in "economic well-being." In some cases, a proper measurement of bur-
dens will correlate to changes in after-tax income, but the benefits that
occur due to voluntary changes in behavior will often be in psychological
well-being-so-called psychic income-or some other nonmonetary ben-
efit which does not connect to after-tax income.
In contrast to both JGT and CBO, OTA's distribution tables reflect
for each income class its best estimates of the actual changes in revenues
that it expects to result from the change in law, taking into account both
the static revenue estimate and predicted behavioral responses.49 OTA,
therefore, is measuring changes in actual taxes paid and if this informa-
tion is combined with changes in pre-tax income, a straightforward deter-
mination of changes in after-tax income becomes possible.
This difference in methodology is extremely important but not well
understood by policymakers. Indeed, while distributing changes in "bur-
47. Id.
48. Each of the observations in this paragraph assumes no changes in macroeconomic
variables or, followingJCT and OTA common practice, ignores such changes.
49. See James R. Nunns, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, OTA's Methodology for
Distributional Analysis 3 (1993).
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den" rather than changes in taxes has been a long-standing practice of
JCT, at least with respect to changes in capital gains taxes, it has only
recently described and defended this process. 50 In an important public
service,JCT has recently published lengthy pamphlets detailing the meth-
odology it uses in producing distributional tables and in making revenue
estimates. 5 ' In 1993, JCT also changed the heading on its tax distribu-
tional tables so that instead of showing "changes in taxes," the third and
fourth columns of the tables now show "changes in tax burden." The
table that follows provides a typical example of aJCT distributional table,
in this case the JCT Summary of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993 which reflects JCT's estimates of the distributional effects of that
legislation:52
TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTIONAL .FFECTS oiF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE
OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION AcT OF 1993 AS PASSED BY CONGRESS
Present-Law Present-Law
Expanded Income
Class
Federal
Taxes
(Billions)
Avg. Tax
Rate
(Percent)
Proposed
change in Tax
Burden
(Millions)4
Burden
Change as a
Share of
Income
(Percent)
Less than $10,000 9 10.4% -1.152 -1.28%
$10,000 to $20,000 39 11.9% -993 -0.30%
$20,000 to $30,000 72 17.0% 94 0.02%
$30,000 to $40,000 86 19.1% 949 0.21%
$40,000 to $50,000 93 20.9% 1,271 0.29%
$50,000 to $75,000 201 22.3% 3,517 0.39%
$75,000 to $100,000 120 24.6% 2,653 0.54%
$100,000 to $200,000 142 26.6% 4,598 0.86%
$200,000 and over 168 30.2% 29,683 5.39%
Total,
all Taxpayers $930 22.1% 40,800 0.97%
(Notes 1, 2 and 3 are omitted)
4. Includes all revenue provisions except Individual and corporate estimated tax
changes, information reporting for discharge of indebtedness, targeted jobs credit,
capital gains incentives, provisions affecting qualified pension plans, mortgage revenue
bonds, low-income housing credit, luxury tax provisions, excise tax on diesel fuel used
on noncommercial motorboats, empowerment zones and enterprise communities, vac-
cine excise tax, GSO and FUTA extensions, transfer of Federal Reserve funds, deduc-
50. See JOT, Measuring Tax Burdens 1993, supra note 23, at 28-29; Staff of Joint
Committee on Taxation, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Explanation of Methodology Used to
Estimate Proposals Affecting the Taxation of Income from Capital Gains 46-47 (Comm.
Print 1990) (dicussing Bush Aministration 1991 budget proposal allowing exclusion of
certain capital gains) [hereinafter Jar, Capital Gains 1990).
51. See JCT, Measuring Tax Burdens 1993, supra note 23. See also JCT, Revenue
Estimation 1992, supra note 45; JCT, Capital Gains 1990, supra note 50.
52. Given the 1993 Act's provisions, there is very little difference among theJCT, CBO
and OTA tables. If a sizeable energy tax had been included, this would not have been the
case.
19951
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
tion disallowance for certain health plans, orphan drug credit, and diesel fuel
compliance.
Source, jGT, August 3, 1993
Note that the first two columns of theJCT table, which show the pre-
change state of affairs, show the distribution of current taxes, not an esti-
mate of the distribution of the burden of existing taxes. This means that
JCT tables contain a mixture of apples and oranges, although the juxta-
position of the figures implies that the columns should be compared.
Thus, for example, in distributing the tax rate increases of the 1993
legislation, theJCT distributional table (Table 1) reflects the increase in
taxes that would be paid by high income taxpayers if the tax rate increase
induced no behavioral response. To the extent that taxpayers avoid pay-
ing additional taxes due to the rate increase by shifting their investment
portfolios, for example, toward tax-exempt bonds, or by substituting lei-
sure or non-market work for taxable income, the increase in tax progres-
sivity will be less than policymakers would naturally expect based on the
JCT tables. If it were possible to look at the effect of the tax rate increase
as it would be looked at retrospectively, say in the year after enactment,
the JCT estimates would, ceteris paribus, always show a smaller increase in
actual taxes paid than the increased tax burden depicted by its distribu-
tional tables. As suggested above, this means that a JCT distributional
table for years following enactment will show a distribution of existing
taxes (columns 1 and 2 of Table 1) that is inherently (and always) incon-
sistent with its methodology for distributing the "burden" of proposed or
enacted tax changes (columns 3 and 4 of Table 1). In other words,
although the JCT is estimating changes in burdens rather than changes
in after-tax income, it does not and cannot measure existing burdens,
only existing taxes paid.
To understand further the implications of this decision, let us look
more closely at a few specific cases that recently have been important in
the policymaking arena: reductions in capital gains taxes, increases in
tobacco taxes, and a recent proposal for a very high tax on certain kinds
of ammunition. First, during George Bush's repeated efforts during the
period 1989-1992 to reintroduce a lower tax rate for capital gains, the tax
policy community focused considerable attention on differences in reve-
nue estimates between OTA and JCT. Beginning with the 1990 Budget
Act, however, differences in their distributional methodologies became
even more important than differing revenue estimates to the politics of
capital gains tax cuts. The capital gains distributions of JCT and OTA
differ for a number of reasons, including the fact that Treasury's measure
of "family economic income" includes capital gains as they accrue, while
JCT's "expanded income" includes gains only when realized, but differ-
ences in defining the income classes have relatively minor conse-
quences.53 Of far greater, indeed critical, importance is JCT's policy of
53. See infra text accompanying note 69.
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distributing the burden using static revenue estimates rather than esti-
mates of the change in tax liabilities after taking behavioral changes into
account. In contrast, OTA's tables distribute its estimates of changes in
actual taxes paid.
In the case of capital gains tax reductions, this practice means that
JCT's distribution omits any effect of increased realizations of capital
gains due to the reduction of capital gains rates, and its distribution ta-
bles depict an overall reduction in tax burden four to six times greater
than JCT's own estimates of the reductions in tax collections due to the
capital gains tax cut. Since the great bulk of tax savings from a capital
gains rate reduction accrues to the upper income classes, any offsetting
tax increase on those classes to achieve "distributional neutrality" inJCT's
tables-whether through base broadening or rate increases-would have
to be four to six times as great asJGT's projected revenue loss of a capital
gains tax reduction. This effect is made clear by the JCT pamphlet on
capital gains discussing the capital gains tax reduction proposed in Presi-
dent Bush's fiscal year 1991 Budget. JCT estimated a total revenue loss
of $11.4 billion during the period 1990-1995, with the greatest revenue
loss in any one year totaling $4.3 billion (in 1992 and 1994). 54 In its
distributional table, however, JCT distributed a one-year tax reduction of
$15.9 billion to upper income individuals-its static revenue loss-an
amount about four times greater than their largest estimated revenue loss
for any year.55 Figure 3 shows the distribution of JCT's estimated reve-
nue loss-the expected change in actual taxes-compared with its own
distribution of the reduction in "tax burden."
54. See JCT, Capital Gains 1990, supra note 50, at 3, 10.
55. See id. at 46.
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These distributions show the alternative revenue increases that would be
necessary in each income class to offset a capital gains tax reduction and
to achieve "distributional neutrality" in a distributional table depending
on whether the actual (estimated) change in taxes or the (estimated)
static effect is distributed. Although JCT's methodology for distributing
capital gains had not changed, for some reason, the capital gains cuts of
the 1993 Act are omitted from JCT's distribution table.5 6
If the capital gains proposal were adopted and JCT's prediction of
revenues proved exactly accurate, its distributions of "existing federal
taxes" in subsequent years would reflect only the actual change in tax
revenues in each income class. Thus, JCT's methodology of distributing
tax proposals is not consistent with its methodology for distributing ex-
isting federal taxes, and a capital gains tax cut would appear to distribute
very differently looking forward and backward.
Moreover, JCT's use of static revenue losses as a proxy for distribut-
ing changes in tax "burdens" creates incentives and opportunities for
political gamesmanship.. For example, in the 1990 Budget Summit Agree-
ment, the multiplier effect from JCT's methodology for distribution of
capital gains was avoided by substituting a proposal equivalent in present
56. See JC, Measuring Tax Burdens 1993, supra note 23, at 3 n.4, 29 Table 1.
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value terms to a capital gains reduction on corporate stock-an immedi-
ate deduction for a portion of the cost of purchasing corporate stock.57
This difference demonstrates the inadequacy of using the static revenue
loss as a proxy for "welfare loss." While the welfare effects of two changes
such as these should be identical, the effects depicted in the JCT's distri-
butional tables were strikingly different, and, as a result, the tax increases
necessary to "neutralize" the distribution effects of the immediate deduc-
tion form of tax cut were one-fifth the size of the tax increases necessary
to neutralize the capital gains rate cut.
likewise, the potential regressivity of proposals for increased tobacco
taxes concerned members of Congress in both 1990, when these taxes
were most recently increased, and again in 1994, when legislators consid-
ered a tobacco tax increase as a means to finance part of President Clin-
ton's health care reform proposals. In distributing the burden of these
tax proposals to income classes, JCT distributes the static revenue loss-
the increased taxes that would be paid if no one stopped or reduced
smoking in response to the change in taxes-even though this reduction
in smoking is the behavioral response that proponents of this particular
tax increase are attempting to induce. Politicians not intimately familiar
with JCT methodology would naturally tend to assume after looking at
JCT's distributional tables that the burden of such a tobacco tax increase
is far more regressive than JCT actually estimates the financial burden
will be. Again, to offset such a tax increase to achieve distributional neu-
trality in JCT's tables, a far larger tax reduction would have to be enacted
for the income classes burdened by the tobacco tax increase. And, once
again, the distributional consequences of such changes would look quite
different retrospectively; a change shown as distributionally neutral when
viewed prospectively would be reflected as an overall tax reduction when
subsequent distributions of existing taxes are taken into account.
For a related example, consider Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan's
1994 proposal for a massive tax increase on certain forms of ammunition.
Here, Senator Moynihan clearly intended to increase the price of such
ammunition so that virtually no one would purchase it. A reasonable rev-
enue estimate of the tax increase would be approximately zero. Unless
57. See News Analysis: Small Business Incentives: An Eight-Fold Path to Who Knows
Where? 49 Tax Notes 133 (1990), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File. For a
demonstration that immediate deduction of the cost of an asset is equivalent in present
value to exempting the gain, see Michael J. Graetz, Federal Income Taxation: Principles
and Policies 386-389 (2d ed. 1988). There were other important differences in the capital
gains and immediate deduction proposals that affected the magnitude of the revenue
losses of the two proposals. The capital gains proposal applied to all existing assets, for
example, while the immediate deduction would have applied only to newly-purchased
assets. But the basic point of the text-the multiplier effect of distributing the burden of
capital gains- holds true with respect to a capital gains proposal applicable only to newly-
purchased assets. The static revenue loss from an immediate deduction did not take into
account stock purchases stimulated by the new tax incentive, and it therefore produced far
smaller effects in the distributional tables.
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JCT abandons its standard practice, however, its distributional table show-
ing the effect of the increased ammunition taxes due to the rate in-
crease-which ignores behavioral changes-would show a very large tax
increase for a handful of people. This seems to be an example of the
kind of case in whichJCT, as it pamphlet suggests, would probably "exer-
cise its judgment and adjust the burden from the static revenue esti-
mate."5 8 Whether the proposed tobacco tax increase would fall into that
category or not is a mystery. Moreover, policymakers are not likely to
know when such adjustments are made or what their size is.
In my view, the JCT staff decision to attempt to estimate changes in
"burdens" rather than changes in taxes is a disservice to the political pro-
cess. First, there will often be no reason to believe that the static revenue
estimate is a good measure of "burden." For example, some people
would quit smoking in response to a twenty cent increase in the cigarette
tax, just as they would in response to a one-dollar increase. For these
people, even under the JGT reasoning, a twenty-cent tax increase is the
correct measure of their burden, not a one-dollar tax increase. This
point holds true for all people who would quit smoking in response to a
tax increase smaller than the one proposed. Second, if one believes that
the appropriate distributional question relates to the changes in after-tax
incomes that result from the change in the tax law, the static revenue loss
generally is totally disconnected from that measure.59
Third, the JCT tables are constructed in a manner that always will
produce different results looking forward and looking backward, even if
all of the important variables turn out to be exactly as the JCT estimates
they will be. If one expects policymakers to look both forward at distribu-
tional effects of proposed changes and backward at the distribution of
taxes after the change, one will find that the JCT staff predictions never
match experience. Couple this problem with the fact that the first two
columns of the JCT table depict distributions of existing taxes and col-
umns 3 and 4 show distributions of changes in "burdens," andJGT's deci-
sion to distribute burdens seems inevitably to add confusion to the policy
process.
Fourth, even if one believes that the static revenue loss is a better
measure of "welfare loss" or "economic burden" than the actual tax in-
creases that will occur, JCT's decision to distribute the static revenue loss
remains troubling. The effort to measure welfare loss does not seem to
answer the question that political decisionmakers are asking. Inevitably,
notwithstanding the JCT's admirable recent publication of its methodol-
ogy and its new willingness to discuss this issue publicly, JCT tax distribu-
tion tables will be understood by political decisionmakers and the public
at large as estimates of the distribution of the change in taxes that the
58. JGr, Measuring Tax Burdens 1993, supra note 23, at 29.
59. See the discussion of Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients, supra text
accompanying notes 33-35.
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changes in law are expected to produce. Of course, this objection might
be dismissed as tautological. If the question the policymaker is asking-
or thinks she is asking-relates to the distribution of the changes in the
taxes that actually will be paid, any answer that departs from this measure
obviously is inappropriate and has the potential for mischief in the polit-
ical process. Different people may reach opposite judgments about the
question being asked, but having tried on a number of occasions in 1990
to have policymakers of both political parties comprehend the JCT's
methodology, I am confident about the potential for misunderstandings.
Finally, further confusion results from the fact that the Treasury and
Congressional staffs have reached differing judgments on this matter.
When tax changes are not expected to induce substantial changes in be-
havior, the estimated static revenue change will not differ significantly
from the revenue estimate itself, and OTA and JCT tables will look very
similar. For example, tables reflecting increased personal exemptions or
limitations on deductions for state income taxes will look very similar
whether produced by OTA or JCT. On the other hand, there will be
important differences in distributional estimates shown by OTA in distrib-
uting actual taxes and the JCT in distributing static revenue losses in
every instance where the expected behavioral responses to a tax change
are large. Tables grouping large numbers of proposed changes will often
include proposals of both sorts.
Multiple presentations of such information may have advantages and
disadvantages. They will demonstrate a wide range of answers for policy-
makers, and when the political masters of the Treasury and Congress are
members of the same party, this may be useful. But when the parties
controlling the Executive and the majority in Congress are different, as is
so often the case, each staff will be accused of manipulating data for polit-
ical purposes or caving in to please their political masters. Surely this
undermines the reliability of the tax policymaking process. Multiple
presentations by the same staff would avoid this problem and probably
should be encouraged.
Although OTA's practice of distributing estimated changes in taxes
generally produces a better estimate of the effects of tax changes on after-
tax income and thus seems preferable to JCT's practice of distributing
static revenue changes (as a proxy for welfare or burden changes), there
are occasions when the distribution of estimated revenue changes itself
might be misleading. For example, OTA estimated that President Bush's
proposed exclusions from income of a portion of capital gains would in-
crease federal revenues in both the short and long term by inducing suffi-
cient additional realizations of capital gains so that taxes assessed on
these additional realizations were predicted to more than offset the taxes
lost due to the exclusion of a portion of gains. OTA distribution tables
therefore showed a tax increase for the upper income classes in circum-
stances where these people clearly would benefit, not suffer, from a capi-
tal gains tax cut. Obviously, the idea that these income groups "deserve"
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some additional tax reduction to offset this increase in taxes is absurd.
The existence of such anomalies offers further evidence of the dangers of
decisionmakers simply relying on the numerical answers provided by dis-
tributional tables to determine the effects of their policies rather than
directly addressing the question of what kinds of offsetting changes, if
any, are necessary to achieve results that can be agreed upon a fair.
Thus, both staffs' methodologies may have significant shortcomings
when assessing certain types of policy changes. Yet relying on the staffs to
make ad hoc adjustments to their standard methodologies when "appro-
priate" to achieve "reasonable" results would give extraordinary discre-
tionary power to the staff and would create significant potential for mis-
chief. In contrast, there is little disagreement about the general
distributional consequences of the kinds of tax changes that I have dis-
cussed here. It would be quite easy for JCT and Treasury staffs to de-
scribe in narrative form the general effects on people at different income
levels of tax changes such as these. However, the process of quantifying
the effects of such changes inevitably introduces distortions.
2. The Measurement of Income. - Although all three of the relevant
tax staffs use an annual measure of income rather than a lifetime mea-
sure,60 there nevertheless is considerable divergence in how the staffs
measure annual income. JCT uses a concept of "expanded income,"
which adds to adjusted gross income for federal income tax purposes esti-
mates of certain cash receipts not included in adjusted gross income.
JCT includes tax-exempt interest, workers' compensation payments, cer-
tain federal entitlement benefits under Social Security and Medicare, and
certain excluded employer-paid fringe benefits such as health and life
insurance. However, JCT does not permit certain deductions disallowed
under the minimum tax (for example, state and local taxes) and makes
an adjustment relating to corporate taxes. Under this measure of "ex-
panded income," JGT includes capital gains only when they are realized
through the sale of assets and includes retirement income when it is actu-
ally received rather than when contributions are made by individuals or
employers to retirement plans or when income is earned by such plans
on behalf of their beneficiaries.
OTA, on the other hand, classifies taxpayers by a very different mea-
sure of income. OTA attempts to measure "economic income" by includ-
ing accruals of capital gains and losses, without regard to whether they
are realized for tax purposes. OTA estimates include imputed income as
it is earned in pension funds and as it accrues in the form of interest
buildup on life insurance. OTA also expands the definition of income to
include a much greater range of nontaxable government transfer pay-
ments, such as AFDG, and includes imputed rent on owner-occupied
housing.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 95-97.
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OTA attempts to adjust its estimates of accrued capital gains for infla-
tion, an adjustment that is not made by either of the other two staffs;
apparently, none of the staffs adjusts interest income or expenses for in-
flation. This means that whenever inflation occurs, interest income is
generally overstated, as are interest deductions, in comparison to infla-
tion-adjusted real incomes. These misstatements distort policymakers'
ability to compare the relationship of taxes to real income both among
different taxpayers (depending, for example, upon their borrowing and
lending practices) and for the same taxpayers across years (since taxpay-
ers with identical real incomes typically have different nominal incomes
in different years).
No doubt most economists would agree that the Treasury's broader
measure of economic income is theoretically more appropriate, but the
data available to the JCT are more reliable. Indeed, the JCT describes its
income concept as "a considered compromise between theory, ease of
implementation, and understandability."61 As is well recognized within
the tax professional community, there are many alternative measures of
income that might be used by these staffs. Indeed, CBO uses a third mea-
sure which is based upon cash receipts and is closely linked to the federal
income tax code's definition of income. CBO ignores noncash income,
accrued, but unrealized, changes in family wealth, and imputed in-
come.62 Thus, CBO's measure of income is closer to JCT's definition
than it is to OTA's. Figure 4 shows the different estimates of effective tax
rates of pre-1993 tax law under the three staffs' different income and clas-
sification measures.
61. J T, Measuring Tax Burdens 1993, supra note 23, at 16.
62. See Kasten, supra note 24.
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Obviously, the tradeoff between greater theoretical purity and more
reliable data is a judgment that different staffs can be expected to make
differently, and, indeed, that even the same staff might make differently
at different times. JCT emphasizes the importance of understandability
in choosing an income measure, although there is considerable irony in
this choice, given its decision to measure changes in economic burden
rather than changes in taxes. People probably will have different judg-
ments about the importance of public understandability as a criterion for
constructing distributional tables. Consider, for example, OTA's decision
to include in income imputed rent on owner-occupied housing. Tax pol-
icy experts recognize such imputed rent to be income in theory,63 and
people readily understand that taxpayers who own their own homes gen-
erally are wealthier than those who do not. If distribution tables were
constructed with respect to wealth, an adjustment for owner-occupied
housing would be important and straightforward, and several of OTA's
63. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 57, at 153-54.
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adjustments can be understood as ways to take differences in wealth into
account through the income measure. On the other hand, most people
do not view imputed rent as income. Consider the following comments
of ABC News' David Brinkley:
Finally, a few words about federal taxes and what some of
the great minds in the U.S. Treasury are thinking about.
The Treasury likes to calculate the American people's abil-
ity to pay taxes based not on how much money we have, but on
how much we might have or could have had. For example, a
family that owns a house and lives in it, the Treasury figures that
if the family didn't own the house and rented it from somebody
else, the rent would be $500 a month. So it would add that
amount, $6,000 a year, to the family's so-called imputed income.
Imputed income is income you might have had, but don't.
They don't tax you on that amount.
The IRS does not play this silly game. Instead the Treasury
calculates how much they could take away from us if they de-
cided to. If that were the system, consider the possibility. How
about being taxed on Ed McMahon's $10 million magazine lot-
tery? You didn't win it, you say? But you could have. The Treas-
ury must have something better to do. If not, there is a good
place for Clinton to cut some spending.64
Politicians (and the public generally) would no doubt have reactions
similar to those expressed by Brinkley. The important question here is
the tradeoff between the benefits of greater theoretical precision and the
costs of public bewilderment or distrust. Obviously, the different tax
staffs have reached. different judgments as to which aim should prevail.
3. The Unit of Analysis: Families, Couples, Individuals, or Households.
In showing the distribution of existing taxes and proposals for change,
the determination whether and how to aggregate members of a family or
household is important. Treating each individual separately would
clearly be a poor choice. It would, for example, generally treat non-work-
ing spouses and young children, who have no independent income, as
having zero or low income, without .regard to the monies earned by a
working spouse on behalf of the family. Nevertheless, the individual is
routinely the unit of analysis in widely used per capita income statistics.
In principle, since a family's or household's aggregate income is typically
shared for living expenses, the family or household is the appropriate
unit for use in distributional tables. For many people, the unit "family"
and the unit "household" are interchangeable and would generally serve
to aggregate income of parents and dependent children, while ignoring
variations in patterns of earning or sharing income.
On the other hand, when a nuclear family has split apart, aggrega-
tion of all family income does not seem appropriate. Some adjustment is
64. David Brinkley, ABC News' This Week with David Brinkley, Feb. 28, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Reutrn File.
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necessary to account for alimony or child support payments. In practice,
the allocation of these payments in distributional tables will tend to turn
on their statutory tax treatment, which, for all practical purposes, is essen-
tially elective. Even when the family stays together, questions remain,
such as when a child should be treated as having moved outside the fam-
ily unit and thus regarded as a separate unit for distributional analysis.
Similar questions occur when there are dependents in the household
who are not children-for example, grandparents residing in the par-
ents' home.
It is surprising that despite the staffs' general theoretical consensus
that the family or household is the appropriate unit for analysis, each staff
follows a different approach in classifying taxpayers. The JCT staff, in
light of the difficulty of constructing family or household income from
data available on tax returns, chooses to stay close to the information
available from tax returns and classifies taxpayers based on tax filing sta-
tus. JCT thus generally does not include minor children along with their
parents; instead JCT generally ignores dependents in constructing distri-
butional tables.65 Because JCT takes no account of dependents who file
separate returns, its methodology eliminates nearly fifteen percent of re-
turns filed. JCT expects to aggregate family income in the future when
the quality of tax data improves through better Social Security number
matching.66
In contrast, OTA and CBO apparently regard the theoretical advan-
tages of using family or household units as outweighing the disadvantages
of having to impute incomes among different tax returns. Thus, despite
the shortcomings of the data available to them, both OTA and CBO use
statistical analyses to estimate total family income and use the family as
their base unit for analysis. There are also a variety of approaches for
determining the division of income within the family.6 7 For example,
65. SeeJCr, Measuring Tax Burdens 1993, supra note 23, at 13 n.16, 97.
66. See id.
67. This issue is demonstrated in the following example from Atkinson:
The choice of weights may make a significant difference. Some of the effects
may be seen from the simple example of a hypothetical, male-dominated, society'
where there are 20 men each with wealth of 20,000, 80 men with 7500, and 100
women with no wealth. All the 20 rich men are married, as are 40 of the 80 men
with 7500, leaving 40 single men and 40 single women. On an individual basis
(commonly employed in wealth statistics, since they are often based on records of
estates at death), the top 10 percent (20 out of 200) own 40 percent of the wealth
(400,000 out of 1 million). Suppose now that we consider the total wealth of the
family (Y), and first treat all families, or single individuals, as one unit.... There
are 140 such families, so that 40 percent of wealth is owned by 14.3 percent (20
out of 140) of families. On the other hand, suppose that we treat a married
couple as two units, each with the benefit of Y wealth. This means, of course, that
the total 'equivalent' wealth is now greater than 1 million (it rises in fact to 1.7
million), which may upset the accountants but is logically quite correct. The 20
rich couples account for 20 per cent of the effective population, and benefit from
47.1 percent (800,000 out of 1.7 million) of the total equivalent wealth. However,
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OTA uses the family as the unit of analysis and attempts to aggregate the
income of parents and their children. CBO uses a methodology common
in social scientists' analysis of poverty and applies an income equivalent
scale to "standardize" families' and households' incomes based on their
differing sizes.
The need to allocate income of entities to individuals or families also
causes some difficulties. For example, how does one allocate to the tax
returns of families, individuals, or married couples the income (and at-
tendant taxes) of a trust that is accumulating income, the subsequent dis-
tribution of which is at the discretion of a trustee? Likewise, after a family
member's death, income can be taxed to an estate over a period of years
awaiting final determination of how the income is to be distributed; this
also causes difficulties in allocating income to the appropriate income
class.68
Once the staff determines the family unit and measure of income to
be used in constructing distributional tables, people are allocated to vari-
ous income classes. Table I, for example, groups people into nine in-
come categories. Distinctions among families in the same income class
are not captured in the distributional table even though in many in-
stances intragroup differences may be more significant than intergroup
differences. For example, if Congress were sufficiently concerned about
the regressive impact of a tobacco tax increase to enact an offsetting tax
reduction so that the distributional table would show no change for peo-
ple in a particular income class, say in the $20,000 to $30,000 class, there
is no reason to assume that the families (or couples) who would be sub-
jected to the tax increase are the same as the families (or couples) who
would benefit from the tax reduction. Indeed, this common use-I ar-
gue misuse-of a distribution table views a tax increase on smokers as
demanding an offsetting tax reduction for nonsmokers. All a distribu-
tional table can show is the overall impact on all the families (or individu-
als or couples) within the same income classification. This rather obvious
point often seems to be lost on policymakers. Moreover, the organization
of the tables by specified amounts of income-the choice of
breakpoints-is itself arbitrary. These nominal income distributions con-
tain very different numbers of people; for example, in 1993 the top classi-
fication (over $200,000) contained just over one percent of the taxpaying
population, while the bottom classification (under $10,000) contained
nearly fifteen percent.69 Organizing the tables by population-say, by
if we treat a couple as two units, but only allocate each a benefit of Y/2.. . then
the top 20 percent has 40 percent of total wealth (which in this case remains at 1
million). The reader should consider other possible variations, including the
cases where some of the wealthy are not married and where women possess
wealth.
A.B. Atdnson, The Economics of Inequality 52-53 (2d ed. 1983) (sexism in the original).
68. Related issues arise in allocating corporate income and, to a lesser extent,
partnership income.
69. JGr, Measuring Tax Burdens 1993, supra note 23, at 106.
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deciles-would simply create the opposite problem; the numbers of units
in each category would be the same but the lowest decile would represent
only one percent of theJCT's income measure while the top decile would
represent more than thirty-five percent of the income.70
4. The Relevant Time Horizon. - The different staffs disagree about
the appropriate time horizon over which changes in the tax law should be
evaluated in order to estimate their distributional impact. OTA-like the
JCT prior to May 1, 1992-assesses the distributional consequences of a
set of legislative changes and attributes them entirely to the year in which
all of the changes are fully phased in. JCT now rejects this treatment on
the ground that it is distorting, for example, with respect to all temporary
provisions, particularly those that expire within the budget horizon,
which would not be reflected at all in the OTA table. Instead, JCT now
generally uses a rough five-year average impact of the tax changes on the
ground that the five-year budget period-prescribed by law as the rele-
vant period for revenue estimating-is the appropriate time horizon to
legislators.71
TheJOT contends that the "correct approach" would be to calculate
the present value of the burden of a tax change in each future year into
the indefinite future, which involves applying an appropriate interest rate
to discount this stream of annual burdens.72 However, the frequency,
indeed the likelihood, of changes in both the tax law and interest rates in
the future makes it questionable whether this approach is indeed
"correct."
As with the differing choices about units for classifying people, there
are arguments supporting each of the staffs' judgments. In some cases,
important differences in distributional tables will result from these differ-
ent time horizons since the magnitude of the change may well depend on
the time period in which it is considered. Moreover, each staff tends to
ignore wealth effects that may be important because of changes in the
values of existing assets that occur due to transitions from existing to new
law.73
5. Tax Incidence Assumptions. - Probably the greatest gulf between
what experts know about taxes and what the public and most politicians
believe is that the economic burden or "incidence" of a tax is often quite
different than its statutory burden. In particular, taxes imposed on and
paid by a business entity must ultimately be borne by people: the busi-
ness's owners, its employees, its customers, or some combination of these
people and perhaps others. The majority of the public seems to fail to
appreciate tax shifting, even when economists are unified in their view
70. See id. at 105.
71. See id. at 31-36.
72. Id.
73. For a discussion of the effects of tax law changes on asset values, see generally,
Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision,
126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 47 (1977).
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about which group of taxpayers ultimately will bear the burden of the tax.
For example, there is essentially no dispute in the economic literature
that virtually all of a payroll tax will, in the long run, be borne by employ-
ees in the form of lower wages. Despite the economic consensus, how-
ever, workers clearly seem to prefer taxes Paid by employers to taxes paid
by themselves, and it would be wrong to fault them as completely naive.
In the short run, the incidence may well be different because employers
may be prohibited by law, contract, habit, or economic conditions from
immediately shifting the burden of the tax to employees by lowering
wages. This short-term advantage, however, may serve to make employees
myopic about long-term consequences of payroll taxes and thereby may
affect substantially the politics of these taxes.
In the case of other taxes, economists frequently disagree about the
shifting of the tax burden. For example, who bears the true burden of
the corporate income tax has long been controversial among economists.
Moreover, the economic incidence of a tax may depend far more on its
details than the economic literature usually suggests. For example, the
appropriate incidence assumptions about corporate income taxes may
depend on the details of corporate tax law, in particular on the rules for
the recovery of capital expenditures. Liberal capital expenditure al-
lowances may have the effect of shifting the corporate tax burden from
owners of capital to labor.74 In their examination of the 1984 corporate
income tax, Fullerton and Rogers suggested that the corporate income
tax should be analyzed, not in the traditional manner of corporate in-
come taxes, but rather in a manner similar to variable excise taxes on
different types of consumption. This suggestion was motivated by the
wide variations in the burdens borne by different corporations, depend-
ing on their capital structure, as well as their industry.75' Today's corpo-
rate income tax is considerably more neutral across industries than it was
a decade ago, but there may still be enough variations to induce excise-
type tax effects.
Until recently, JCT did not distribute corporate income tax changes
at all on the ground that the incidence of the tax was too uncertain.
JCT's refusal to distribute corporate tax changes had enormous practical
consequences for policymakers relying on distributional tables as a basis
for their political decisions. Not distributing corporate income taxes cre-
ated political incentives for policymakers to locate tax-reducing provi-
sions at the corporate level (where they would not reduce progressivity in
the distributional tables) and tax increases at the shareholder level
(where they would increase progressivity in the distributional tables). In
the 1990 budget negotiations, for example, it was not possible to offset
regressive distributional burdens of selected excise taxes on the middle
class through corporate tax changes, and President Bush would not agree
74. See Fullerton & Rogers, supra note 24, at 76-91.
75. See id.
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to significant individual income tax rate increases. In addition, under
this distributional methodology, economically similar policies would be
treated very differently in the distributional tables; for example, integra-
tion of the corporate income tax in the form of a dividend exclusion or
shareholder credit for individuals would show up as a substantial tax re-
duction for high income individuals, while corporate tax integration
through a deduction for corporate dividends would be ignored in the
tables.
Since 1992, JCT has allocated both corporate income and related
corporate taxes to owners of capital generally. OTA uses a similar inci-
dence assumption. In contrast, the CBO has used three corporate tax
incidence variations in recent years, sometimes treating the tax as borne
by owners of capital, sometimes treating the tax as borne by labor (which
the CBO says is more appropriate in an open economy with global capital
markets), 76 and sometimes allocating the tax half to labor and half to
capital.77 As Figure 5 shows, differing corporate tax incidence assump-
tions are significant in assessing the distribution of tax burdens and tax
changes.
76. See Congressional Budget Office, The Changing Distribution of Federal Taxes:
1975-1990, 22-28 (1987); cf. Jane G. Gravelle, Corporate Tax Incidents in an Open
Economy, 1998 Vol. of the Proc. of the Nat'l Tax Ass'n 173 (1994) (contending corporate
taxes are borne by capital even in an open economy with global capital markets).
77. See Kasten, supra note 24, at 8 (stating that recent CBO studies "assumed that half
of the corporate income tax was allocated to all income from capital and half to labor
income").
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Concerns and ambiguities about the economic incidence of taxes
and tax changes create enormous problems for staffs attempting to con-
struct distributional tables. Obviously, making firm assumptions when tax
incidence is uncertain or controversial can have a major influence on
policy. For example, the decision to allocate the corporate income tax
burden completely to owners of capital, rather than to divide it evenly
between owners of capital and labor or consumers, concentrates that tax
in the higher income brackets. If those analysts who contend that con-
sumers or workers bear at least part of the burden of the corporate in-
come tax are correct, the current distributional tables make the existing
tax system appear more progressive than it actually is. Currently, in order
to make a distributionally neutral change to offset a reduction of corpo-
rate income taxes, higher taxes must be imposed on upper income indi-
viduals. To the extent that the corporate tax is borne in part by consum-
ers or workers, reductions in corporate taxes would, in fact, be spread
more generally across income classes. Finally, if corporate income taxes
are particularly inefficient and inhibitive of economic growth, as many
economists believe, tradeoffs between efficiency and equity look quite dif-
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ferent depending on how the incidence of the corporate tax is assigned
in distribution tables.
The problem of allocating corporate income and corporate taxes by
income class is further complicated by the desire to treat equivalent poli-
cies consistently in distributional tables in order to maintain a semblance
of policy coherence and to limit gamesmanship. JCT's pre-1992 practice
of distributing changes in individual taxation of corporate source income
but not distributing changes in taxes at the corporate level, as suggested
earlier, created a bias in favor of a dividend deduction method of integra-
ton over shareholder-level methods, such as dividend exclusions or
shareholder credits. This choice was made even though it would have
substantial effects on other issues, such as the impact of integration on
tax exempt entities and foreign shareholders.78 JCT's current methodol-
ogy eliminates this kind of problem by allocating the corporate tax en-
tirely to owners of capital, thereby treating a dividend deduction method
of integration as generally equivalent to a shareholder credit or dividend
exclusion. However, this parity would not exist if, for example, part of
the corporate tax were allocated to consumers or to labor, given that the
distributional tables for shareholder-level integration would be con-
structed using the standard assumption that the individual income tax is
not shifted.79
A proper desire for consistency in demonstrating distributional bur-
dens of policy equivalents creates additional conundrums for the staffs.
To take an important example, JCT now distributes a value-added tax, or
any other broad-based consumption tax, to wage earners and existing
owners of capital rather than in the more traditional manner of distribut-
ing the burden entirely to consumers. This method allows the distribu-
tion of consumption taxes when the income is earned and parallels the
treatment of income or wage taxes.80 As Figure 6, which is reproduced
from the 1993 JCT distribution pamphlet, shows, this allocation of con-
sumption taxes to earners rather than consumers produces a burden of
consumption taxes that differs from the typical allocation to consumers-
particularly those at the higher end of the income distribution. Again,
this decision may have important policy implications: The new JCT
method of allocating consumption taxes means that replacing income
taxes with consumption taxes would require a much smaller offsetting tax
increase on high income taxpayers in order to produce neutrality in a
JCT distribution table.
78. See U.S. Treasury Dep't, Corporate Tax Integration: Taxing Business Income
Once 36 (1992).
79. For a suggestion that individual level taxes on businesses conducted in the
partnership or proprietorship form might be partially shifted, see Boris I. Bittker, Effective
Tax Rates: Fact or Fancy? 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 780, 799 (1974).
80. See JC, Measuring Tax Burdens 1993, supra note 28, at 51-60.
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FIGURE 6
BURDEN OF A 5% BROAD-BASED CONSUMPTION TAx AS A PERCENTAGE OF
PRE-TAx INCOME
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Source: JCT 1993, Table 3.1. (pC) is the tradittonal method of distributing a consumption tax-to consumption.
2. (pY) Is the method adopted by the JCT In 1993-dstribution to wages and old capital.
Consumption taxes may take a variety of forms. For example, states
in this country routinely impose retail sales taxes; the European Commu-
nity uses credit-method value-added taxes; Canada uses a subtraction-
method value-added tax. A subtraction method value-added tax (or busi-
ness transfer tax) has similar incidence and should be distributed in a
manner similar to a credit-method value-added tax. Some advocates of
such a tax, however, prefer the labels "cash flow corporate income tax,"
"uniform business tax," or some other term to the label "value-added
tax." Needless to say, one cannot change one's judgment about tax bur-
dens as labels change, a point that emphasizes the need to examine the
details of a tax in order to know how to distribute it.81
81. This also underlines the point made above that capital recovery allowances in the
direction of expensing of capital purchases move the corporate income tax burden away
from capital and on to labor. See supra text accompanying note 74. This may raise doubts
about the judgment of both OTA andJCT that corporate taxes should be allocated entirely
to capital in distribution tables. On the other hand, an allocation of the corporate tax
entirely to capital might be defended as the most conservative course if JGT and OTA
distributional estimates were intended to protect against changes that might inadvertently
make the distribution of after-tax income less equal.
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The problem of assessing tax incidence is pervasive. To take one
additional example, economists tend to agree that an excise tax imposed
on final consumers of a particular product is a tax on consumption. Each
of the three staffs generally distribute selected excise taxes consistent with
that premise, although their methodologies vary. In the short term, how-
ever, producers and workers in the industries affected may bear the bur-
den of the tax. This phenomenon was widely believed to have occurred
in connection with the ten percent excise tax on luxury boats adopted in
the 1990 Budget Act.82 Advocates for the boating industry, some in-
dependent economists, and virtually all politicians came to believe that
instead of burdening the very wealthy purchasers of luxury yachts, as had
been intended, the excise tax burden in the period immediately follow-
ing enactment was borne predominately by laborers engaged in the con-
struction of such boats.83 Putting aside the truth of this judgment,8 4 the
standard decision to ignore short-term distributional effects of taxes was
proved wrong in this case. Once Congress was given information regard-
ing the perceived short-term effects of the tax, Congress repealed it.
As this example illustrates, political decisionmakers would probably
like to know both short-term and long-term distributional consequences
of legislative decisions, particularly when a serious impact on labor in
concentrated areas or industries might reasonably be predicted. Short
and long term differences are much more easily captured through a nar-
rative report of the distributional consequences of proposed legislation
than through distributional tables.
If the affected workers are abroad, p6litical consequences may be the
opposite. Congress, for example, might be little concerned-or even
pleased-if the excise tax on so-called gas-guzzling automobiles was
borne by the workers who produce these automobiles, not, as the distri-
butional tables suggest, by purchasers of these automobiles, since much
of the production of these cars occurs abroad. Distributional tables sim-
ply do not alert decisionmakers to the potential consequences of their
actions in circumstances like these. Nor do they alert decisionmakers to
regional variations in the tax burden, as for example, occurred with the
luxury excise tax on boats. However, regional differences generally are
82. See OBRA 90, supra note 5, at § 11221.
83. For reactions to the tax, see, e.g., House Passes Revenue Act of 1992, 356 to 355,
Tax Notes TodayJuly 16, 1992, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, Taxtxt File (comments
of Rep. Clay Shaw); Senate Passes Unemployment Compensation Bill, by 66-33, Tax Notes
Today, Mar. 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, Taxtxt File (comments of Sen.
George Mitchell).
84. The discussion in the text offers a very shorthand description to make the point
that short-term and long-term effects may differ in significant ways that are not taken into
account in the distributional tables. How the change itself is accounted for would depend
importantly, for example, on whether "burden" or "taxes" are distributed and on a number
of other factors. See Dennis Zimmerman, Congressional Research Service, The Effect of
the Luxury Excise Tax on the Sale of Luxury Boats (1992) (noting factors that affect
demand for luxury boats).
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treated as a horizontal, not as a vertical, equity issue, and are not re-
flected at all in distributional tables.
Excise taxes enacted for the specific purpose of correcting externali-
ties or reducing consumption of specific goods are taken up below.
D. Controversial Areas of Staff Agreement
I now turn to some important areas where the staffs agree. Agree-
ment does not, however, signal that an issue is settled or non-controver-
sial. Despite staff agreement, many important issues remain.
1. Tax Capitalization and Implicit Taxes. - As the preceding discus-
sion of tax incidence suggests, a fundamental issue in constructing distri-
bution tables is how to treat market reactions to various taxes and
changes. Obviously, by distributing taxes in accordance with their eco-
nomic rather than statutory incidence, each of the staffs takes certain
kinds of market responses into account in constructing distribution ta-
bles. No reasonable analyst advocates distributing the burden of tax legis-
lation by its legal rather than economic incidence, notwithstanding the
uncertainties involved in the latter exercise. However, the determination
of when to stop attempting to take market reactions into account is not
easy. This problem is well illustrated by the distributional treatment of
the 1986 Tax Reform Act's limitations on tax shelter investments.
In 1986, Congress enacted a major tax reform that was said to be
distributionally neutral and revenue neutral. Apparently, this was taken
to mean that the legislation should be revenue-neutral in each income
class.s 5 However, during the 1970s and early 1980s, many high income
taxpayers had invested in a wide variety of so-called tax shelters. Invest-
ments in real estate, exploration and development of oil, gas and other
natural resources, motion picture production, and certain fanming activi-
ties were all eligible for tax benefits and were favored tax shelter invest-
ments. Eliminating the widespread availability of such tax shelters was an
important substantive goal of the 1986 Act.86 In making these kinds of
tax-advantaged investments under the pre-1986 law, taxpayers reduced
their income taxes, but typically at the cost of a lower pre-tax return from
the tax-shelter investment than they would have received from an invest-
ment of similar risk that did not enjoy tax advantages. No good measure-
ment of the adjustments to pre-tax returns in the tax-favored areas, how-
ever, was available for use by the relevant tax staffs.
In contrast, the magnitude of these effects in the case of tax-exempt
state and local bonds can easily be determined from the difference in
return on tax-exempt and taxable bonds of similar maturity and risk. His-
85. See Steuerle, supra note 2, at 106-08. If "burdens" rather than taxes were
distributed, the legislation would have had to be "burden" neutral in each income class.
86. See Mark N. Uhlfelder & Eric S. Kracov, Summary of Major Provisions Accepted
by Tax Bill Conferees, reprinted in Tax Analysts, Tax Notes Today, Aug. 22, 1986, available
in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNT File.
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torically, returns on state and local bonds have ranged between about
seventy and ninety percent of returns on comparable taxable bonds.
There is a large literature discussing the reductions in pre-tax rates of
return for holders of tax-exempt bonds-reductions that have come to
be called "implicit taxes"-and evaluating the efficiency and equity impli-
cations of the trade-off between lower interest rates and tax savings.8 7
Even when data are available, however, distributional tables typically re-
flect these kinds of reductions in pre-tax rate of return only in measuring
taxpayers' incomes. The tables do not treat implicit taxes as a tax inci-
dence issue.
The best treatment of implicit taxes is far from clear, but the staffs'
uniform decision to ignore the widespread tax shelter phenomenon in its
distributional tables in 1986 had important effects. In determining the
1986 tax rates necessary to achieve distributional neutrality, Congres-
sional decisionmakers relied on distributional tables to determine the tax
rates necessary only to compensate for actual taxes paid at each income
level, ignoring the implicit taxes-reductions in the pre-tax returns-on
tax-favored assets. In combination with the direct restrictions on tax shel-
ters in the 1986 Act, this rate schedule prompted a shift away from tax
shelter investments into taxable investments. This shift necessarily pro-
duced higher pre-tax income for these upper bracket taxpayers, which,
given substantially lowered rates on upper income individuals under the
new rate schedule, would naturally result in a foreseeable reduction in
progressivity from purportedly "distributionally neutral" tax legislation.
In 1986, this effect on progressivity was exacerbated by the fact that much
of the tax increase for upper-income taxpayers was in the form of retroac-
tive tax increases on pre-1986 tax shelter investments, tax increases that
had only a temporary impact in increasing taxes of upper-income people,
even though the provisions themselves, as well as the accompanying rate
reductions, were permanent changes in the law.
This standard practice of ignoring changes in pre-tax returns on tax-
favored assets also dramatically distorts distributional tables that are pro-
duced annually byJCT to show the distributional effects of particular tax
expenditures. Using quite different methodologies, David Bradford and
I (at an interval of about a decade) attempted to "correct" the official
estimates showing the distribution of the benefits resulting from exclu-
sion of interest on tax-exempt bonds. I proposed to correct this distribu-
tion by reflecting the interest cost savings of state and local governments,
reflected in the investor's lower pre-tax return, on the assumption that
the additional interest costs that would result from repealing the tax ex-
emption would have to be made up through increased taxes by the state
87. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do
Misallocations Drive Out Inequities?, in The Economics of Taxation 19 (HenryJ. Aaron &
MichaelJ. Boskin eds., 1980).
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and local governments.88 David Bradford took quite a different approach
and attempted to measure the implicit tax iripact more directly by con-
structing effective tax rates, taking into account the reductions in pre-tax
returns that result from the exclusion.89 The difference in results of our
methodologies and the official estimates are depicted in Figures 7 and 8.
FIGuRE 7
GRADE CORREC=D DiSRBUTION OF TAX ExEMPT STATE AND LocAL
BONDS
Low- 10k to ...50k
0 to to 50k
10k 20k Annual Income Class
Source: Graetz, 1975.
Note: The numbers for Groetz were scoled to 1990 by multiplying the percentage of total benefits for
each class In Graetz 1975, by the total amount of interest deductions in CRS, 1990.
88. See MichaelJ. Graetz, Assessing the Distributional Effects of Income Tax Revision:
Some Lessons from Incidence Analysis, 4J. Legal Stud. 351, 360 & n.39 (1975).
89. See David F. Bradford, Untangling the Income Tax 243-55 (1986).
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The major revisions Bradford and I made to the standard distribu-
dons, depicted in Figures 7 and 8, reflect efforts to take into account the
"price" effects of the exclusion of state and local bond interest. Price
effects lower the interest rate received by the upper income purchasers of
these bonds. Changes in tax rates typically wil have price effects. In the
case of municipal bonds, prices of such bonds increased in anticipation
of and in response to the tax rate increases of the 1993 legislation. 90 Mar-
tin Feldstein has argued that assessments of the equity of any tax reform
should take such price effects into account and that changes in such
prices due to a change in legislation should be treated as a departure
from standard notions of horizontal equity.91 I have disagreed with this
view.92
There are many difficult issues in evaluating how and when to take
market responses, such as estimated effects on pre-tax returns, into ac-
count. Unlike actual taxes, Congress is unable to spend the changes in
investors' pre-tac returns due to repeal of tax advantages-the "implicit
90. See Tom Herman, Tax Report, Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1993, at Al.
91. See Martin Feldstein, On the Theory of Tax Reform, 6 J. Pub. Econ. 77, 94-97
(1976).
92. See Graetz, supra note 73, at 79-81.
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taxes." Congress even seems likely to have difficulties understanding the
concept. It may therefore be futile for the staffs to attempt to construct
distribution tables that reflect reductions in pre-tax returns even when
the data are available. On the other hand, distributional tables that are
as misleading as the official tables distributing the benefits of the tax ex-
empt bond exclusion can be quite harmful when used in the tax legisla-
tive process. In this case, for example, they disguise a change that will
almost certainly reduce the after-tax income of low- and middle-income
taxpayers as one that affects only high-income taxpayers.
Most economists would suggest that the way out of this dilemma, in
theory at least, is to perform a general equilibrium analysis and to ex-
amine changes in the distribution of after-tax income within a general
equilibrium framework assuming the enactment of the proposed legisla-
tion. This would take into account effects of the tax rules on pre-tax re-
turns both before and after the legislation. But the data demands of such
general equilibrium analyses are large, the required assumptions are
many, and the answers that result are sensitive not only to the limitations
of data and the assumptions made but also to the structure of the general
equilibrium model. Moreover, general equilibrium models typically are
not capable of estimating effects of relatively small changes in policy.
The mathematical elegance of general equilibrium analyses seems likely
to produce a false sense of precision, even in circumstances of consensus
about the general direction of change.93 Nevertheless, the "black box"
quality of general equilibrium analysis is probably no more inscrutable to
a legislator than the current distributional methodology, and where the
nature of the change and time permit, something may be learned from
engaging in such analysis. OTA, for example, has recently published re-
sults of three differing general equilibrium analyses of corporate tax inte-
gration.9 4 A similar general equilibrium analysis of President Clinton's
health reform proposals might have been quite useful in illustrating the
likely direction and perhaps even impact of such a substantial proposal
for change on important economic variables.
2. Lifetime vs. Annual Income. - Recently public finance economists
have embraced the view that distributional burdens of taxes (and perhaps
other government actions, including expenditures) should be estimated
with respect to a lifetime rather than an annual measure of income.95
Indeed, a lifetime perspective has begun to creep into the tax staffs' anal-
ysis of tax distribution. For example, CBO recently assessed the distribu-
93. Some of the fhlse sense of precision would be eliminated if a range of estimates-
a so-called confidence interval-were provided. Potential improvements in the legislative
process resulting from presenting a range of revenue estimates are discussed infra text
accompanying notes 146-147.
94. See U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Income, supra note 78, 111-52 (1992); see also
Fullerton & Rogers, supra note 24, at 9-15.
95. See Fullerton & Rogers, supra note 24, at 17-21; Alan J. Auerbach et al.,
Generational Accounts: A Meaningful Alternative to Deficit Accounting, in Tax Policy and
the Economy 55, 55-56 (David Bradford ed., 1991).
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tional burdens of excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco with reference to a
lifetime income measure, 96 andJCT contends that its method of distrib-
uting consumption taxes approximates a lifetime perspective.97 But
these are exceptions; generally, all three staffs distribute tax changes with
reference to annual rather than lifetime income.
Classifying people and measuring tax burdens with respect to their
annual income has some obvious distorting characteristics, such as classi-
fying students and elderly people as poorer than they may be. It also
emphasizes equal annual earnings rather than equal annual consump-
tion, and as a result makes early consumers seem poorer than early earn-
ers. Economists have long used a life-cycle framework in explaining
much of people's savings behavior, and this view of savings as a temporary
postponement of consumption has been used to argue in favor of using
lifetime income as an index of people's relative well-being.98 A full dis-
cussion of this issue is well beyond the scope of this Article, but, as Figure
9 below demonstrates with respect to the distribution of a broad-based
consumption tax, the choice between an annual and lifetime perspective
may have substantial effects on the distributions shown.
96. See Congressional Budget Office, Federal Taxation of Tobacco, Alcoholic
Beverages, and Motor Fuels 2-3 (1990) [hereinafter CBO, Tobacco, Alcohol, and Fuels
1990].
97. See JCT, Measuring Tax Burdens 1993, supra note 23, at 57-58.
98. There is considerable dispute in the literature as to how much of the disparity of
wealth holdings is explained by life-cycle savings. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 67, at
76-77.
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FIGuRE 9
DISTRIBUTION OF A 5% BROAD-BASED CONSUMPTION TAX
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1. 0o.C) and (pY) are the same distributions as those of Figure 6.
2. The VAT Is distributed over lifetime income.
3. The VAT plot is an approximate mapping of Metcolfs decile distribution into JCTs Income classes.
First, a philosophical grounding for a lifetime basis for measuring
relative well-being has yet to be fully developed, even though a lifetime
perspective finds substantial support in certain fundamental philosophi-
cal concepts, including the idea that people should be responsible for
their actions throughout their lives and prudent in preparing for both
old age and emergencies. A lifetime view might also be defended as a
better approach in advancing equality of opportunity over equality of
outcome.
On the other hand, the contrary view also enjoys philosophical sup-
port. Derek Parfit, for example, contends that our future selves might
better be thought of as persons different from whom we now are and that
people may rationally care far more about their present than future
selves, in a manner analogous to the greater care they experience for
themselves than others.99 This suggests philosophical difficulties that
99. See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 92-93, 190-91 (1984).
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cannot be solved by discounting future income to present values as a basis
for comparing people's well-being.1 ° °
Norman Daniels grounds an argument for the equity of a lifetime
perspective in public policy regarding health care in the claim that "con-
sistent differential treatment by age will equalize over time," i.e., that the
young and the old may be treated differently at any moment in time but
over time people will be treated both ways.1°1 The validity of this argu-
ment, of course, is dependent on consistent treatment of certain age
groups over a long period of time, something that no Congress can
assure.
Most economists who have embraced the lifetime measure of ability
to pay purposes of tax policymaking have done so without either serious
argument or defense. Often it seems they have done so because they
prefer consumption to income taxation (perhaps because of its lesser tax-
ation of savings).102 However, in the absence of perfect capital markets,
high lifetime income may not reflect high current ability to pay taxes,
particularly when liquidity constraints are serious. Short-term precau-
tionary savings may operate to smooth consumption over several years
rather than over a lifetime.
Moreover, there are major difficulties in assessing lifetime income.
First, given pervasive uncertainty about the future, discounting future es-
timated income to the present is fraught with difficulties. As a conse-
quence, some analysts simply use annual consumption as a proxy for per-
manent or lifetime income, 03 but it is clear that, in principle, bequests
and inheritances must also be taken into account.10 4 However, none of
the methods as yet developed for taking bequests or inheritances into
account is fully satisfactory.10 5
In addition, particularly for lower- and middle-income persons, an-
nual consumption may well be a better measure of a person's ability to
pay taxes than her annual income. At the very top of the wealth distribu-
tion, however, this is not the case.
100. Einer Elhauge, Health Law Policy- The Moral Paradigm (1993) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review).
101. Norman Daniels, Am I My Parents' Keeper?: An Essay on Justice Between the
Young and the Old 41 (1988).
102. See Bradford, supra note 89, at 148, 149-54 (advocating imposing tax burdens
according to an individual's opportunities rather than according to more traditional
concepts such as an individual's ability to pay).
103. See, e.g., GBO, Tobacco, Alcohol, and Fuels 1990, supra note 96, at 2; James M.
Poterba, Lifetime Incidence and the Distributional Burden of Excise Taxes, 79 Am. Econ.
Rev. 325, 325 (1989) (papers and proceedings).
104. See Henry J. Aaron & Alicia H. Munnell, Reassessing the Role for Wealth
Transfer Taxes, 45 Nat'l TaxJ. 119, 119 (1992).
105. See, for example, Fullerton & Rogers, supra note 24, at 74, who simply assume
that any inheritances received must correspond to bequests transferred, an assumption
that affects only the lifetime income classification of people who receive bequests.
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Even if one regards a lifetime, as opposed to an annual or multi-year
measure of income, as having significant philosophical or economic ad-
vantages, the implications of such an advantage is far from clear in the
political context in which these distributional questions are being asked.
As Tom Barthold of the Joint Committee Staff has pointed out, politicians
do not tend to regard an individual who is making $200,000 in a current
year as having the same current ability to pay taxes as an elderly individ-
ual earning $35,000 even if the present value of their lifetime incomes is
the same. 10 6 A person's current ability to pay is certainly relevant since
taxes must be paid currently to finance government currently.
Of even greater significance, our system of government does not give
one Congress the power to bind the legislation of a subsequent Congress.
Therefore, it is impossible for any group of legislators to make a viable
binding political commitment to fair taxation over a person's lifetime.
The fact that the current Congress cannot commit the policies of future
Congresses encourages self-interested people lobbying legislators to try
always to maximize their present interests. This alone might well make it
of special concern to legislators to know who wins and who loses in terms
of their present status. In addition, it may well be appropriate, for exam-
ple, that an age cohort that experiences its peak income-producing years
during wartime, when higher taxes have historically been required to pay
for the nation's defense, pays more in lifetime taxes than an age cohort
whose peak earnings occur during peacetime, when taxes have histori-
cally been lower, even though a lifetime perspective would regard this as
unfair.
Fullerton and Rogers have suggested a strong equity criterion that
would require both that current taxes reflect current ability to pay and
that lifetime taxes reflect lifetime ability to pay.10 7 Even if one embraces
this criterion in principle, however, it is difficult to imagine how it would
be enforced in practice.'08 Even if one rejects a lifetime income measure
in general, a lifetime perspective may nevertheless offer useful and im-
portant information in assessing the fairness of tax changes. First, it sug-
gests the importance of looking at how proposed tax changes affect dif-
ferent age cohorts, both as a way of alerting decisionmakers to the fact
that measures of current income for the young and old may understate
their abilities to pay and also to raise to the level of explicit decisionmak-
ing issues of intergenerational equity.10 9 Indeed, important policy initia-
tives-for example, a wide range of tax legislative provisions governing
106. See Thomas A. Barthold, How Should We Measure Distribution?, 46 Nat'l TaxJ.
291, 292 (1993).
107. See Fullerton & Rogers, supra note 24, at 93 n.2.
108. Consider Figure 9 above, which shows the difference in distribution of a broad-
based consumption tax using annual and lifetime income classifiers.
109. See Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Generational Accounting- Knowing Who Pays, and
When, for What We Spend 115-21 (1992); Auerbach et. al, supra note 95, at 92
(predicting that future generations face approximately 20% larger net tax burdens than
current newborns).
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retirement savings and income-that are troublesome from an annual
perspective may well be far more justified from a lifetime perspective.' 1 0
In addition, where taxes are being imposed in an effort to induce
taxpayers to shift consumption away from specific harmful items of con-
sumption, such as alcohol or tobacco, toward a less harmful consumption
mix, the fact that a tax that looks regressive on an annual basis may not
be unduly problematic. Legislators should be alerted to the fact that
these type of taxes may be proportional or even progressive when viewed
on a lifetime basis. In addition, distributional tables do not in any way
distinguish the effects of taxes such as these, which are deliberately being
used to penalize or even to change undesirable behavior, from situations
where taxes are simply being used to raise revenue. Figure 10 compares
the effects of a cigarette tax increase to both annual income and annual
expenditures (often used as a proxy for lifetime income.)
FIGURE 10
NET INCREASE IN CIGARETTE TAx AS A PERCENTAGE OF PoST-TAX
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Source: OBO, 1990.
Note: The numbers are for 1990.
Congress may in this context want to examine the distributional bur-
den of these taxes over a time horizon longer than one year. Studies
suggest that tobacco taxes are proportional in regard to lifetime income
and that alcohol taxes are slightly progressive."' To the extent that legis-
110. See Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax
Policies, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 851, 852-55 (1987).
111. See CBO, Tobacco, Alcohol, and Fuels 1990, supra note 96, at 80.
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lators are preoccupied with making a JOT or other staff distributional
table look "right," however, such legislation will be inhibited. In this case,
distribution tables based on annual income tend to serve poorly the legis-
lative process. 112
Despite the staffs' virtually universal use of annual income measures,
the impact of tax legislation on various age cohorts and on inter-genera-
tional equity is very important and deserves to be highlighted. More gen-
erally, the appropriate role of lifetime or multi-year income perspectives
for assessing ability to pay in the political process deserves ongoing atten-
tion and debate.
3. Distributing Transfers as Well as Taxes. - All three of the staffs
recognize that in distributing tax changes or existing taxes, they are
presenting only a partial picture of the distributional effects of govern-
mental actions. JCT, for example, remarks:
The full effect of government policies on the economic well-be-
ing of different groups of individuals can only be determined by
examining the burdens and benefits imposed by changes in ex-
penditure policy as well as tax policy .... The effects of...
expenditure program[s] will be ignored in the JCT distribu-
tional analysis which looks only at tax changes."13
JCT defends this practice on four grounds: (1) its staff has no particular
expertise in distributing expenditures and to do so would increase con-
siderably the work of that staff; (2) it is impossible to consider state and
local governments' burdens and benefits-an objection that applies with
equal force to distributing taxes alone; (3) most proposals for tax changes
do not have specific expenditure changes associated with them-a claim
that today seems unrealistic, particularly since most tax changes in recent
years have been part of omnibus budget legislation and, in any event, is
irrelevant; and (4) the policymakers who make greatest use ofJCT distri-
butional analyses are interested in isolating the distributional effects of
tax changes-in other words, the staff claims to be answering only the
questions that have been asked. However, given that alternatives .to taxes
are often used as a tool for implementing governmental policies, distribu-
tional effects of non-tax governmental action should not be ignored. The
staffs' decision to do so often presents a misleading picture.
The important difference between a distribution of taxes alone and
one that combines taxes and transfers is depicted in Figure 11, which
shows an estimate of the distribution of both taxes and transfers from the
1992 Economic Report of the President:
112. This effect will be exacerbated by tables that distribute burdens rather than
taxes. See supra Part II.C.1.
113. JCT, Measuring Tax Burdens 1993, supra note 23, at 2 (evaluating tax changes
without regard to changes in expenditures).
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FIGuRE 11
Em CS OF TAXES AND TRANSFERS ON INCOME, 1990
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The omission of transfers from the distributional tables is especially
misleading in the case of payroll taxes used to finance old age, survivors,
and disability insurance benefits, and health insurance benefits under
Part A of Medicare. Both of these programs were designed (and em-
braced by the American public) as programs of social insurance under
which wage earners and their employers would make contributions
through a payroll tax equal to a fixed percentage of wages (or some por-
tion thereof) and, in exchange, would receive wage replacement retire-
ment benefits, survivors' and disability insurance, and hospital insurance
during retirement. The growth of these payroll taxes as a percentage of
federal revenues is the single most striking fact in the development of the
nation's tax policy in recent decades. 114 Indeed, recent expressions of
concern regarding increased tax burdens on middle class families over
the last decade are largely attributable to the rise in payroll taxes.
As tax policy analysts know well, the Social Security payroll tax is re-
gressive when viewed in isolation, but the Social Security system is quite
progressive when benefits are taken into account. Nevertheless, estimates
of the existing tax burden and of changes in tax burdens since 1977
(which is frequently used as a baseline by CBO), or since 1980 (which
marks the beginning of the Reagan Administration), routinely include
payroll taxes without taking into account the benefits that they finance.
Figure 12 shows the distribution of social security taxes alone and Figure
114. These taxes have risen from less than 10% of total budget receipts in 1952 to
nearly 40% in 1992. See generally, Graetz, supra note 15, at 21.
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13 shows the distribution of social security taxes and benefits. The distri-
butional implications of these two pictures are quite different.
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Source: OTA.1, The annual income quQnties are based on Census money income for 1987.
2. Net faxes Is equal to social security taxes paid minus social security benefits received.
Obviously, methods of distributing the benefits of government ex-
penditures are no less disputable or demanding of questionable judg-
ments than are distributions of taxes or tax burdens. Indeed, many of the
same questions discussed here regarding the units of analysis, income
classifiers, economic incidence, and the like are present in the realm of
expenditure distribution and are perhaps even more controversial. Even
in answering a question limited to the distribution of Social Security ben-
efits, there are serious issues about how best to show the combination of
taxes and benefits. For example, the picture in Figure 13 above, which
shows a current year's distribution of taxes and benefits, looks quite dif-
ferent than an analysis that examines payroll tax contributions with refer-
ence to rates of return experienced by various income cohorts.' 15
The one important exception to the omission of government ex-
penditures from tax distributional tables is the inclusion of outlays under
the refundable earned income tax credit ("EITC"). The most likely ex-
planation for this practice is that EITC outlays are governed by a provi-
sion of the Internal Revenue Code, rather than other titles of the U.S.
Code, but this explanation cannot be fully satisfying, even if one has
come not to expect purity.
115. Cf. Michael J. Boskin et al., Social Security: A Financial Appraisal Across and
Within Generations, 40 Nat'l TaxJ. 19, 31-32 (1987).
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Despite the theoretical difficulties and problems with data, ignoring
government transfers in a political context is a major disservice, particu-
larly to a nation experiencing fiscal stress due to a long-standing federal
deficit problem. For example, ignoring government benefits makes it
easier for politicians to promise and support middle class tax cuts in ap-
parent sympathy for the recent increase in middle class burdens despite
the well-known fact that an enormous share of federal government enti-
tlement expenditures benefits the middle class. The share of govern-
ment expenditures targeted to people at or near the poverty level is im-
portant, but far from the full story. Many government expenditures,
including, for example, Medicare, Social Security retirement benefits,
and farm subsidies substantially benefit middle- and even upper-income
families. Distributional tables limited to taxes alone-particularly when
Social Security and health payroll taxes are included-present a very mis-
leading picture, either in the context of tax increases to fund additional
spending or, vice versa, spending reductions to fund tax reductions.
4. Benefit Taxes and User Charges. - As the brief discussion of to-
bacco and alcohol taxes suggests, 116 the reason for enacting a tax change
may influence the most appropriate method of showing the distributional
effects. It is difficult, and in some cases naive, simply to ignore adverse
distributions in such cases. The preceding section, which emphasizes the
significance of government transfers, raises particular questions for the
distribution of taxes levied on the "benefit" principle, including both ex-
plicit user charges, such as entrance fees at the national parks or fees for
animal grazing rights on federal lands, and other benefit-based taxes, of
which federal and state gasoline taxes to fund federal highway construc-
tion and repair are today probably the most important. 1" 7 The proper
treatment of these taxes is not clear. Showing the burdens without the
benefits is clearly misleading, as suggested above. On the other hand,
leaving these kinds of taxes out of the "distribution of current taxes" col-
umn or ignoring the distribution of changes in such taxes entirely is not
an attractive alternative. This alone may suggest that providing Congress
with a "distributional table" is an unfortunate oversimplification.
5. Mandates and Regulations. - Closely related to the question of
distributing government expenditures or benefits along with taxes is the
issue of the distributional impact of non-tax regulations and government
mandates. During consideration of what was to become the Clean Air Act
of 1990,118 Congressman Pete Stark (D. Calif.) of the Ways and Means
Committee introduced a proposal" 9 for taxes based upon levels of sulfur
dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions of electric utilities in lieu of a regu-
latory emission permit trading mechanism that was ultimately adopted by
116. See supra text accompanying note 111.
117. See generally Congressional Budget Office, User Charges and Benefit Taxes
(1994); see also CBO, Tobacco, Alcohol, and Fuels 1990, supra note 96, at 56-58.
118. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399.
119. See H.R. 4177, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess. (1990) (Stark bill).
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the Congress. Under standard staff practices, no distributional tables
were (or would be) constructed with regard to a regulatory system con-
trolling emissions, although there should be little disagreement that to
the extent that a regulatory system imposes pollution control costs on
electric utilities, those costs will generally be passed on to consumers in
the form of higher electricity prices. If such an increase in electricity
prices was distributed to income classes in a manner similar to that of an
excise tax on electricity, the changes would be shown to have a quite re-
gressive distribution.
Using.the tax system rather than regulation to control harmful exter-
nalities, such as pollution, would induceJCT to construct a distributional
table that would depict the regressive burden of the tax change.120 Along
with the public's general anti-tax sentiment and some institutional resist-
ance to using the tax system as a regulatory device, this dramatic differ-
ence in distributional practices would tend to inhibit the use of the tax
system to control externalities, even in circumstances where a tax might
prove to be a better instrument of government policy. The chloro-fluoro-
carbon (CFCs) tax imposed by the 1989 legislation offers a good example
of an effective tax enacted primarily for environmental reasons. 121 Pro-
posals for carbon taxes (or other energy taxes) as a means to address
problems of global warming offer additional potential examples.
The issue of evaluating distributional consequences of government
requirements or mandates also occurs in connection with legislation such
as the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993122, which mandates that
employers provide certain benefits to employees. A far more significant
example was President Clinton's health care reform proposal, which
would have required employers to make payments for a substantial por-
tion of the costs for their employees' health insurance coverage. Gener-
ally, such mandated payments on behalf of employers are shifted to em-
ployees through reductions of wages. 123
In testimony in February 1994, Robert Reischauer, Director of CBO,
concluded that the mandate in the Clinton health care plan should be
treated similarly to a tax for federal budgetary purposes. The Clinton
Administration had hoped to reach a different result by requiring that
employers' and employees' mandatory payments be made directly to state
120. Recall thatJGT uses the "static" revenue estimate in estimating "burden." See
supra text accompanying notes 45-48. If, however, the excise tax serves to induce
electricity users to internalize costs they are imposing on others, there is at least a question
about whether the excise tax should be counted as a "burden" at all.
121. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7506,
103 Stat. 2106, 2364-69.
122. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6.
123. SeeJonathan Gruber & Alan B. Krueger, The Incidence of Mandated Employer-
Provided Insurance: Lessons from Workers' Compensation Insurance, (National Bureau
of Economic Rsearch Working Paper No. 8557), reprinted in 5 Tax Policy and the
Economy 111-44 (1991).
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health alliances, instead of deposited with the Internal Revenue Service,
which would then pass them on to the health alliances.
Regardless of the niceties of the administration of such mandates or
their budgetary labels, it is unmistakable that a federal law that requires
employers to pay a specific amount for the health insurance coverage of
each of their employees places an economic burden on employee wages,
with distributional consequences somewhat similar to a payroll tax. In-
deed, if the amount required to be paid on behalf of each employee is a
per capita amount, rather than a percentage of payroll, the distributional
burden on employees would be considerably more regressive than a flat-
rate payroll tax.
Putting aside the (metaphysical but important) political question
whether these mandates are in fact taxes, constructing any distributional
table for the Clinton health care financing proposals would have been a
daunting task. First, the amounts of payments required by employers and
their employees were proposed to vary across regions depending on local
health care costs, and the relationship of these regional variations to re-
gional variations in wages is difficult to know. For this and other reasons,
it is impossible to tell when the proposed caps on employer contributions
as a percentage of payroll (never greater than 7.9 percent) would be
binding under the Clinton Plan. The caps would bind for some employ-
ers but not for others and would be more likely to be binding in some
regions than in others. One can hazard a guess that ifJCT or OTA were
asked to prepare a distributional table of the proposed Clinton Health
Security Act, they would decline to do so on the grounds that the data
simply do not permit fulfillment of such a task-a position similar to that
taken byJCT prior to 1992 (which it has since reversed) with respect to
luxury excise taxes and corporate tax changes.
Notwithstanding the difficulties of constructing a distributional ta-
ble, however, the general distributional burden of President Clinton's
employer-mandate financing mechanism is clear. The burdens will be
borne by employees in a manner not dissimilar from the burden of pay-
roll taxes generally, but in some instances, in a more regressive manner.
Likewise, the distribution of specific tax increases on tobacco and the
payroll-based "assessment" for corporations (which do not join regional
alliances) is clear. If distributional tables were constructed for the Clin-
ton health care financing system in the manner traditional for tax pro-
posals generally, they would prove an enormous embarrassment for the
President. Such tables would suggest a major middle class tax increase,
which would not only contradict the President's campaign promises of
tax cuts for the middle class, but would also contrast sharply with his oft-
repeated insistence that at least seventy percent of the tax increases of the
1993 Budget Act be borne by people with incomes over $100,000.
A full accounting of the distributional consequences of the Clinton
health care proposals, however, would ease this embarrassment substan-
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tially, because, as I have discussed above,12 4 government expenditures as
well as taxes should be distributed in these kinds of distributional tables.
This seems particularly true in a context such as health care reform,
where new taxes would be imposed to fund specific enumerated benefits.
As with Social Security, combining the distributional burden of the Clin-
ton health care proposal's mandates (or taxes) and its benefits would al-
most certainly convert a quite regressive financing burden into a progres-
sive system, although there almost certainly would be some, perhaps
substantial, net tax increase on families with incomes below $100,000.
Commentators have emphasized that the Clinton health care financ-
ing scheme has been designed largely in response to widespread public
anti-tax sentiment and the attendant political difficulties of enacting any
broad-based tax financing mechanism. The analysis here suggests in ad-
dition that relying predominantly on a complex system of mandates also
avoids the considerable embarrassment to the President that would result
from the normal staff distribution tables that would be prepared by OTA,
CBO, orJCT if taxes were substituted for mandates. Even without a distri-
butional table, of course, any of these expert staffs could describe gener-
ally the likely distributional patterns of the Clinton health care proposal.
6. Federalism. - None of the staffs distribute taxes that are imposed
at the state rather than the federal level. However, many state and local
governments have tied their tax systems directly to the federal system so
that when federal income tax law is changed, some state and local tax
burdens will automatically change as a result, unless the state government
enacts specific legislation to avoid the changes. Federal tax legislation
may also have less direct effects on state and local tax burdens. As sug-
gested above (see Figure 7), repeal of the federal tax exemption for inter-
est on state and local bonds, for example, would necessarily involve a
state and local government tax response-a response that typically is ig-
nored in distributional tables prepared by the federal tax staffs. 125 Other
impacts of federal tax legislation on state fiscal systems may be even less
direct; for example, the repeal of the federal income tax deduction for
state sales taxes in 1986 was a major factor in Connecticut's substitution
of state income taxes for a portion of its state sales taxes. In this case, the
federal change ultimately tended to make the state tax system more
progressive.
The decision of all of the staffs to omit state tax effects seems a rea-
sonable one, given the difficulties of doing the relevant calculations and
the great variations from state to state and, in some cases, even within
states. However, the picture presented in the distributional tables will be
incomplete. State and local tax effects may, in some instances, be sizable,
and when they are, they should be identified for policymakers.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 113-115.
125. See supra text accompanying note 88.
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7. International Aspects. - Our nation's economy has become inex-
tricably linked with world-wide markets and investments. But none of the
staffs' distributional tables allocate any portion of proposed or enacted
tax changes to foreigners, nor do the distributional tables commonly
presented typically take into account changes in Americans' behavior
made possible by integrated capital markets and the global economy.
Many tax proposals now advanced are intended to change the taxa-
tion of international income, sometimes focusing on the taxation of U.S.
source income of foreign persons, sometimes on U.S. taxation of foreign
source income of U.S. persons. Moreover, many proposals primarily
designed to change U.S. tax policy may also affect substantially the U.S.
taxation of foreigners or foreign income of U.S. persons. Proposals for
integration of the corporate income tax and substitution of some form of
broad-based consumption tax for all or a portion of either corporate in-
come taxes or payroll taxes offer two prominent examples. Finally, inter-
national capital mobility may require different analyses of the incidence
of U.S. taxes or tax incentives. CBO, for example, grounds its decision
not to allocate the entire corporate income tax burden to owners of capi-
tal on the difference between an open and closed economy. 126
The JCT pamphlet on distribution methodology defends its practice"
of ignoring the effects of U.S. tax changes on foreign persons.' 27 JCT's
judgment not to attempt generally to estimate such effects seems reason-
able, given uncertainties about how foreign governments might respond
to U.S. changes and the limited current technical capacity of the staff to
make such analyses. JCT also defends the omission of analysis of any
impact on foreign persons on the ground that "domestic individuals or
family units" are "the group with whose well being members of Congress
and others are most likely to be concerned,"' 2 8-a claim that is indisputa-
ble as stated but which ignores Congress's interest in shifting tax burdens
to foreigners. That JCT's approach may be reasonable does not, how-
ever, make the omission of international aspects from distributional anal-
yses any less important.
Far more questionable is JCT's decision to ignore foreign income
taxes, but not foreign source income, of U.S. persons in its distributional
tables.129 To the extent that foreign taxes have been imposed on such
income and U.S. taxes have been eliminated through the foreign tax
credit, this practice has the effect of greatly understating the tax burden
126. See Congressional Budget Office, The Changing Distribution of Federal Taxes;
1975-1990, 22-23 (1987); cf. Jane G. Gravelle, Corporate Tax Incidents in an Open
Economy, 1993 Vol. of the Proc. of the Nat'l Tax Ass'n 173 (1994) (contending corporate
taxes are borne by capital even in an open economy with global capital markets).
127. See JCT, Measuring Tax Burdens 1993, supra note 23, at 78-81 (justifying
practice primarily on grounds of practicality of calculation).
128. Id. at 81.
129. See id. at 109-10; Joint Committee on Taxation, Summary of the Revenue
Provisions of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (HR2264), at 109 (1993).
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on U.S. persons who earn foreign source income relative to people who
earn only domestic source income. JCT's treatment of foreign source in-
come and foreign income taxes also has the general effect of decreasing
the effective tax burden that is shown for high-income people, since more
foreign source income is earned by people in the upper-income brackets.
The inconsistency of theJCTr decision to ignore foreign taxes while claim-
ing to reflect welfare losses or changes in "burdens" in its tables is particu-
larly striking. As more and more people expand their investment portfo-
lios to include foreign source income, the incompleteness of
distributional tables as a result of ignoring international aspects will grow
in significance.
E. A Preliminary Conclusion Regarding Distribution Tables
The problems of distributional tables detailed above make clear that
they are often misleading. The relevant staffs disagree over the incidence
of certain taxes, the taxpaying unit to be evaluated, the appropriate mea-
surement of income, and even the meaning of distributing a change in
taxes. In principle, there is nothing wrong with such disagreements.
They generally reflect reasonable, but different, judgments by the various
staffs about controversial questions of theory as well as about the best
compromise between theoretical purity, limitations of data, and public
and politicians' understanding. Even within the same staff, however,
compromises are not made consistently. JCT, for example, emphasizes
understanding and practicality over theory in its income measure and in
its family classifier, yet attempts to achieve greater theoretical purity in
distributing "burdens" rather than actual taxes. OTA has reached the
opposite judgment on all three of these issues, although with regard to
the question of distributing tax changes or "burden" changes, there
seems to be a disagreement over the best answer even in theory. When
more than one staff is involved in the process of estimating distributional
aspects of tax changes, or even when only one staff is involved but its
personnel changes at frequent intervals, as now seems to be the case at
both JCT and OTA, judgments will vary from staff to staff and even within
the same staff over time.
Areas of staff agreement seem to be no less important or controver-
sial in the construction of distributional tables than the areas of disagree-
ment. These include the decision to use an annual rather than lifetime
(or some intermediate period) income measure, the omission of govern-
ment expenditures, regulations and mandates from distributional analy-
ses, the omission of state and local taxes, and the failure to take into
account foreign taxes. Whether the staffs agree or disagree on particular
issues, the precision reflected in tables of the distributional effects of
changes in the tax law is false and potentially misleading.
In my opinion, distributional tables should be abandoned as a basis
for legislative decisionmaking while legislation is being drafted. Their
current capacity to constrain policy decisions disadvantages the tax legis-
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lative process. The typical economist's response to empirical uncertain-
ties-producing a range of estimates or indicating confidence intervals-
is an inadequate response to the fundamental inadequacies of these ta-
bles which I have detailed here. .Politicians, journalists, and the public
are incapable of reaching informed and consistent judgments about the
compromises that should be made among the relevant variables; even if
they were capable of such judgments, there is no reason to expect any
more agreement or better results from those groups than from the pro-
fessional staffs. The distributional tables that the staffs produce, however,
create the illusion of precision. They endeavor to tell policymakers pre-
cisely how much change in taxes (or "tax burden") is anticipated to be
experienced by people at various income levels; they appear to predict
within one-tenth of one percent changes in effective tax rates that are
expected to result.
In practice, if a particular distributional result is desired by powerful
politicians or if a particular distributional outcome is regarded as unac-
ceptable by these politicians, two consequences seem likely. First, one
staff's methodology must dominate the process. In recent years, that staff
has been JOT. Perhaps this is because the Democratic majority in Con-
gress preferred its results to those of the Treasury during the Republican
Administration. Second, important policy decisions and tax law changes
will turn on the dominant staff's distributional analysis. Clearly, JCT's
decision to provide policymakers with tables that distribute tax burdens
rather than estimated tax changes inhibited, perhaps even defeated, a
capital gains reduction during the period 1989-1992. I do not wish to
debate here whether capital gains tax cuts are good or bad as a matter of
policy, but only to insist that distributional tables grounded in staff judg-
ments, which at a minimum are controversial, should not be playing such
a substantial role in the tax legislative process.' 30
To take but one other example, in 1990, rumors were rampant that
the earned income tax ("ETTC") provisions of the 1990 Act were changed
at the last moment to reduce the adjustments in the amount of credits for
family size in order to change a distributional result in the JCT tables that
turned largely on that staff's use of tax return filing units rather than
families as the distributional classifier, and on its selection of distribution
classes and their breakpoints. I do not wish here to dispute JCT's choice
to use that income classifier or the breakpoints it has chosen (nor does it
really matter whether the EITC policy was in fact changed in the way
described). The important point is that it was certainly plausible to those
involved in the 1990 Act that the EITC policy might have been revised
solely in order to reach (or avoid) a particular distributional result in the
tables. If this in fact happened, it undermined basic policy agreements
that had been made over the course of a year's debate about the use of
180. I say similar things about revenue estimates in Part II of this Article.
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earned income tax credits to subsidize child care.' 3 ' Regardless of one's
view about the merits of particular tax changes, this is no way to make
policy decisions. The false precision of distributional tables, however, has
had and in the future seems likely to have precisely that influence.
III. REVENUE EsTImATEs
A. Overview of the Revenue Estimating Process
In this Part, I briefly discuss the political uses of revenue estimates
and recommendations for potential improvements in the revenue esti-
mating process. My principal intention is to make clear the relationship
and the differences between the distributional and revenue estimating
processes and to identify the major problems that have emerged with re-
gard to revenue estimating.
Unlike the distributional issue, the problems created by the central
role of revenue estimates in the tax lawmaking process have been la-
mented elsewhere. 132 Indeed, something of a consensus seems to have
emerged in the academic literature about needed improvements in the
production and use of revenue estimates. As a result, my treatment of
this issue here can be relatively brief. My goals in this section are simply
to demonstrate congressional willingness-even determination-to be
bound by meaningless or, in some cases misleading, numbers, to illumi-
nate the shortcomings of existing revenue estimating practices, and to
identify proposed solutions.
In general, an estimate of the revenue consequences of a proposed
change in tax law is simply a staff's best estimate of the difference be-
tween federal receipts with and without the changes in law for each year
of the budget period. The estimate of receipts without the proposed
change is the baseline receipts forecast, which is based upon an assumed
level of certain macroeconomic variables, including Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP), the overall price level, interest rates, total employee compen-
sation, total domestic investment, and the total level of state and local
taxes.1a3
Revenue estimates, like distributional tables, hold these macro-
economic variables constant, but revenue estimates do take other rele-
131. The 1990 expansion of the EITC had been considered as a part of child care
legislation by the House in 1990. Both the House child care legislation and the Senate
version of the 1990 Budget Act included larger family size adjustments in the EITC than
were finally adopted. See generally OBRA 90, supra note 5; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 964,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN. 2740.
132. See AlanJ. Auerbach, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 46 Nat'l TaxJ. 519,
519-26 (1998); Emil M. Sunley & Randall D. Weiss, The Revenue Estimating Process, 11
Am.J. Tax Pol'y, 261, 265 n.6 (1992); see also Boris I. Bittker, Erwin N. Griswold Lecture,
11 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 213 (1994); Harry L. Gutman, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on
Taxation, Address Before the New England Tax Institute (April 25, 1992) [hereinafter
Gutman], available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, Taxtxt File.
133. See Sunley & Weiss, supra note 132, at 265 n.6.
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vant behavioral changes into account. For example, revenue estimates
are based upon estimates of the increase or decrease in tobacco con-
sumption expected to occur in response to changes in tobacco tax rates;
they take into account increases or decreases in capital gains realizations
expected as a result of changes in capital gains tax rates. Holding
macroeconomic variables constant when estimating revenue effects has
long been controversial.134 Holding such estimates constant eliminates a
range of disputes over the consequences of proposed legislation, facili-
tates comparisons of various proposed changes, and makes tax projec-
tions consistent with budgetary estimates of spending proposals. The
public finance economist, Alan Auerbach, who recently served as Deputy
Chief of Staff ofJCT, which is responsible for revenue estimating for the
Congress, has remarked that the opposite course-incorporating esti-
mates of macroeconomic effects of tax legislation-"places the estimator
in the very uncomfortable position of having to claim confidence in an
estimate in which no sensible person could have much confidence."' 3 5
Nevertheless, significant tax changes are likely to affect these
macroeconomic variables, and if these effects are large, they could
change the size of the revenue estimate and in some cases even whether
the revenue estimate is predicted to raise or lose revenue. Changing the
process for revenue estimating would no doubt raise similar questions
with regard to spending estimates. On balance, holding macroeconomic
variables constant when tax reductions are being considered is the more
conservative course and generally protects to some extent against rosy
scenarios. Not taking predicted macroeconomic effects into account in
revenue estimating, however, remains quite controversial, especially when
large changes, such as health care reform, are under consideration.
The seemingly straightforward starting point for revenue estimates-
the baseline forecast of receipts without the proposed changes in law-is
itself somewhat ambiguous, particularly when current law is in dispute or
is otherwise unclear. The tax treatment of purchases of intangible assets,
such as business goodwill or customer lists, offers a recent instance.' 36 In
1993, when Congress was considering changing the tax treatment of
purchases of intangibles, the Supreme Court decided Newark Morning
Ledger Co. v. United States,'3 7 a case involving the taxation of newspaper
subscription lists-a customer-based intangible asset. The Court's deter-
mination of the current law treatment of this intangible asset might have
had a substantial effect on the estimate of baseline receipts and, as a re-
sult, caused a change in the revenue estimates of proposals for changing
134. The 1994 election of Republican majorities in the House and Senate has
renewed interest in the issue. See, e.g., Leader Chosen for Congress. Budget Office, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 11, 1995, at A9; R.C. Loryworth, Debate: How to Keep Score on a Tax Cut?,
Chi. Trib., Jan. 15, 1995, at Cl.
135. Auerbach, supra note 132, at 523; see also Gutman, supra note 132.
136. See 26 U.S.C. § 167(a) (1988).
137. 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
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the law. Indeed, before the Court's decision in the case, a fourteen-year
amortization period for purchases of intangible assets, including good-
will, had been estimated to be revenue-neutral; after the decision, enact-
ment of the fourteen-year amortization was estimated to raise more than
one billion dollars during the period 1994-1998.1s8 Likewise, in 1993,
Congress clarified the law regarding the treatment of certain losses of
savings and loan associations. Here the change in law was estimated prin-
cipally to speed up two to three billion dollars in revenues that otherwise
would have been realized in subsequent years. But this estimate was
based on the revenue estimators' assumption that the government's liti-
gating position would ultimately prevail; if the revenue estimators had
discounted the government's litigating position or dismissed it as unlikely
to be successful, substantially greater revenue would have been attributed
to the change in law.
The most difficult aspect of revenue estimating is anticipating
changes in behavior that will be induced by changes in the tax law. Dur-
ing 1989, 1990 and 1991, differences between the judgments ofJCT and
Treasury revenue estimators about the likely behavioral responses of peo-
ple in realizing capital gains in response to lowered tax rates became a
revenue estimating cause celebr. During the five-year budget period, rela-
tively small differences in the two staffs' behavioral assumptions produced
more than a twenty billion dollar swing in projected revenue effects of a
proposed exclusion from income of thirty percent of capital gains. For
the years 1990-1995, Treasury estimated in 1990 that the proposal would
increase revenues by $12.5 billion, while JCT estimated a decrease of
nearly $11.5 billion. Virtually all of this gap was due to differences in
assumed behavioral responses: first, Treasury assumed a short-run elastic-
ity of 1.2, JCT 1.1;13 9 second, Treasury assumed a long-run elasticity of
0.8, JCT 0.66; and finally, Treasury thought it would take three years to
reach the long-run, JCT only two years.' 40 Most economists would not
view the existing empirical evidence as sufficient to choose confidently
between these assumptions, but such small differences in assumed behav-
ioral responses can, and did, have large effects on the revenue
estimates.141
188. See Full Text of W&M Committee Report for H.R. 2141: Revenue Estimates, Tax
Notes Today, May 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, Taxtxt File (offering
estimate of $2.097 billion, reflecting revisions after Newark Morning Ledger v. U.S.).
139. See Sunley & Weiss, supra note 132, at 285.
140. See id. at 286.
141. See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. Discussion of
Revenue Estimation Methodology and Process 6-7 (Comm., Print 1992); Staff of the Joint
Comm. on Taxation, 101st Cong. 2d Sess., Explanation of Methodology Used to Estimate
Proposals Affecting the Taxation of Income from Capital Gains 4 (Comm. Print 1990);
Sunley & Weiss, supra note 132, at 286; Infighting Over Revenue Estimates: The Capital
Gains Debate, Tax Notes Today, April 23, 1990, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, Taxtxt
File.
[Vol. 95:609
PAINT-BY-NUMBERS TAX LAWMAKING
The anticipated revenue loss from the 1981 universalization of eligi-
bility for tax-favored individual retirement accounts ("IRAs") has become
a notorious example of a grossly underestimated change, attributed
largely to the estimators' failure to anticipate the mass marketing of IRAs
by banks and other financial institutions. 142 When revenue estimators
aggregate a large number of individual revenue estimates for specific
changes to predict the overall revenue effect of a piece of tax legislation,
they often claim to rely on their patron saint, "St. Offset," who they hope
will assure that their errors are not all in the same direction but will in-
stead tend to offset one another, resulting in an acceptable overall predic-
tion and error rate.143
Commentators have long recognized that revenue estimates differ in
reliability, depending on both the quality of data available to the revenue
estimators and the difficulty of predicting how the change will be per-
ceived and acted upon by taxpayers.'4 No one denies, for example, that
a revenue projection for increases or decreases in the personal exemp-
tion for the blind is far more reliable than an estimate of the revenue
change from enacting or repealing special tax allowances for particular
kinds of investments.' 45
More than two decades ago, in the first law review treatment of reve-
nue estimating, I urged that revenue estimators "supply a range of esti-
mates," the size of which would "provide insight into the reliability of the
estimate," and that Congress should establish "categories" for revenue es-
timates depending on their likely accuracy. 146 I came to call these catego-
ries "green light" estimates, estimates that lawmakers could proceed to
use with a high degree of confidence; "yellow light" estimates, which
should be used with caution; and "red light" estimates, the reliability of
which was so uncertain that they should not be used at all. More recently,
public finance economists who have participated in the tax legislative
process have also called for a range of estimates. For example, Alan
Auerbach has complained that "existing rules and institutions leave no
room for confidence intervals (which indicate the range of variation in
the estimates that cannot reasonably be ruled out), the normal method of
indicating the degree of statistical uncertainty."147
One opponent of requiring the staffs to provide revenue estimates
vith a range or confidence interval of their statistical reliability is Bernard
Schmidtt, the JCT staff member currently responsible for revenue esti-
mates, who contends that such ranges "would only add additional com-
142. See Sunley & Weiss, supra note 132, at 283-84.
143. See id. at 285.
144. See Michael J. Graetz, Reflections on the Tax Legislative Process: Prelude to
Reform, 58 Va. L. Rev. 1889, 1417-20 (1972).
145. See id.
146. Id. at 1422.
147. Auerbach, supra note 132, at 520 (citation omitted).
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plexity." 48 Another opponent, Howard Nester, a former head of reve-
nue estimating for Treasury, asserts that "you cannot give politicians a
range" because it would inhibit their ability to "put it together and come
up with a coherent range."149 Given the tendency of congressional deci-
sionmakers to enact complex and otherwise indefensible legal rules sim-
ply in order to make revenue estimates "come out right," this latter argu-
ment against supplying a range for estimates-grounded in its potential
inhibiting effect on legislators-may well be a cogent argument on its
behalf.
B. Asking the Wrong Question
Routine congressional reliance on estimates of questionable reliabil-
ity has been compounded by Congress' insistence on grounding parlia-
mentary objections during consideration of legislation and, in some in-
stances, even legal compliance with general budgetary requirements, on
predictions of changes in revenues for each year of a five-year budget
period. Beginning with the enactment in 1985 of the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Budget Act,'50 estimates of the annual revenue effects of legisla-
tion directly triggered sequestration, a series of across-the-board spending
cuts. This central role for revenue estimating continued through the
1987 Amendments of Gramm-Rudman' 51 and was, if anything, enhanced
by the so-called pay-go requirements of the 1990 Budget Act which linked
sequesters of "entitlement" spending-spending on such things as Medi-
care, Medicaid, and farm price supports-to five-year estimates of the an-
nual revenue effects of tax legislation. The amendments also required
that any provisions that are estimated to lose revenue in any year of the
budget period must be offset by revenue-gainers of a magnitude equal to
the forecasted loss.' 52 This basic mechanism of the 1990 Act remains in
force, but the Senate has expanded the relevant period for revenue esti-
mates from five to ten years in some circumstances.' 5 -
There is no need to describe further the arcana of this budget legis-
lation, since my limited point is that Congress has mistakenly elevated the
significance of estimates of annual revenue effects of tax legislation for
148. Bernard A. Schmitt, Commentary, 10 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 299, 303 (1992).
149. Howard W. Nester, Commentary, 10 Am.J. Tax Pol'y 803, 305 (1992).
150. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
177, § 251, 99 Stat. 1037, 1063-72.
151. 1987 Amendments to Gramm-Rudman, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 8001-05, 101 Stat.
1330, 1330-280-83.
152. See OBRA 90, supra note 5, at § 13101.
153. See S. Con. Res. 63, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); see also Senate Passes Budget
with IRS Compliance Amendment, Tax Notes Today, Apr. 4, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, Taxtxt File (transcript of debate on S. Con. Res. 63). Indeed, the proposed
constitutional amendment to require balanced budgets, passed by the House but narrowly
rejected by the Senate in 1995, was grounded in estimates of government receipts and
spending. See Andrew Taylor, Budget Amendment's Fate Hinges on a Handful of
Democrats, 53 Cong. Q. 355, 358 (1995).
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each year of a five- or ten-year budget period by tying potentially serious
spending and tax consequences to these numbers. A politician therefore
is behaving quite reasonably-given these constraints-when her domi-
nant concern in considering tax legislation is making the revenue
numbers "come out right." The diminished capacity of the traditional
normative concerns of taxation-fairness, economic efficiency, and sim-
plicity-to influence legislation in this context is not surprising.
Nor should it be surprising that the revenue estimates themselves
have taken on increased significance, or that legislators have become ex-
perts at playing revenue estimating games in an effort to achieve the legis-
lative outcomes they desire. A few examples of such revenue estimate
games should suffice to illustrate the potential aberrations from account-
ing for revenues on an annual cash-flow basis within a specified budget
period. Generally, these games involve accepting long-term pain to
achieve short-term gain.
First, cash-flow "budget window" revenue estimates greatly influence
the design of tax provisions. For example, the close relationship between
investment tax credits, expensing of assets, and accelerated depreciation
is well known in the tax policy literature. 154 Reasonably sophisticated
analysts, for example, can construct proposals for accelerating deprecia-
tion, partial expensing of assets' costs, or investment tax credits that are
equivalent tax reductions in terms of their present value, but that involve
quite different timing of the tax reductions and therefore have very dif-
ferent impacts on annual revenue estimates during a budget period.155
The following graph illustrates various potential revenue effects of one
such possibility:
154. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Accelerated Capital Recovery, Debt, and Tax Arbitrage,
38 Tax Law. 549, 549-50 (1985).
155. For an example of such an analysis, see Jane G. Gravelle, Estimating Long-Run
Revenue Effects of Tax Law Changes, 19 E. Econ. J. 481, 481 (1993) (discussing JCT's
refusal to estimate revenues beyond "revenue horizon" because figures would be too
"uncertain").
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FIGuRE 14
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A related phenomenon occurs with respect to the choice between
"front-loaded" and "back-loaded" savings incentives. With respect to the
former, the taxpayer deducts the cost of the investment when made, ac-
cumulates investment income tax-free, and pays taxes when the funds are
withdrawn. In the latter case, the taxpayer gets no deduction for putting
the funds in the savings account, accumulates investment income tax-
free, and pays no tax when the funds are withdrawn. When interest and
tax rates are constant over time, the present value of the revenue cost of
these two approaches is the same, but the pattern of revenue effects is
quite different.156 Front-loaded savings accounts have large revenue costs
in the years of savings; back-loaded accounts cost substantial revenues in
the years of withdrawal. During the period 1989-1994, proposals to re-
store the universal IRA, which had been repealed by the 1986 Tax Re-
form Act, often took the back-loaded form, principally because the
delayed revenue costs did not occur in the budget window, and, there-
fore, under the Budget rules, neither triggered spending cuts nor re-
156. See JCr, Revenue Estimation 1992, supra note 45, at 8-9; Gravelle, supra note
155, at 490.
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quired offsetting tax increases.' 57 The graph that follows illustrates the
differences in revenue patterns of IRAs of equal present value.
FiGuRE 15
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Probably the most venerable technique for taking advantage of cash-
flow revenue estimating is the "speed-up." A speed-up simply moves reve-
nues that would otherwise be collected in a later year to an earlier year.
The last year that the federal budget was in surplus was 1969-a surplus
that was made possible in part by changes in rules for the deposit of with-
held income and payroll taxes, so that revenues that otherwise would
have been collected in fiscal year 1970 were moved into 1969.158 More
recently, Congress's favorite speed-up has been accelerating collections of
required estimated tax payments from individuals and corporations. Ex-
traordinarily complex individual estimated tax provisions were adopted
in 1991 solely to accelerate revenues to "pay for" extensions of unemploy-
157. See id. For various IRA proposals, see Senate Continues Budget Debate, Tax
Notes Today, Apr. 8, 1994; Summaries of Today's Important Tax Items, Tax Notes Today,
Nov. 13, 1991; Text of McIntyre's Testimony Before Ways and Means is Available, Dec. 18,
1991 (testimony of Citizens for TaxJustice), all available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, Taxtxt
File.
158. See 35 Fed. Reg., 19,114-15 (1970).
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ment benefits. 15 9 Here, the temporary revenue gain was used only to pay
for a temporary increase in spending, but budget rules permit using such
a temporary gain to pay for a permanent revenue loser. This occurred,
for example, in the provisions enacted in 1994 for financing the tariff
reductions of the GATT Uruguay Round Agreements Act; the most ex-
treme example was the speed up of deposits of certain excise taxes from a
due date in October to an earlier fiscal year by requiring these taxes to be
deposited on September 29.160
Probably the most egregious use of budget scorekeeping rules to fi-
nance permanent tax reductions with temporary revenues is the sale of
government-owned assets to pay for permanent tax changes. It is obvious
that the revenue losses from the tax reductions will continue to decrease
receipts long after the proceeds from the asset sale have been spent.
As a final example of revenue estimating gamesmanship, consider
the creative use of temporary (or expiring) provisions. Budget
scorekeeping rules, along with revenue estimating conventions, allow
Congress to enact "temporary" tax increase provisions and then to count
as revenue gains subsequent extensions of the temporary provision. This
occurs because the "baseline" estimate of receipts does not include reve-
nues from the expiring tax increase. As long as the temporary provision
does not fund a special budgetary "trust fund," the revenue loss from the
expiration of the tax does not "score" for revenue estimating purposes
and the additional revenues from the extension can thus be spent on
other revenue losing enactments. Obviously, this game increases deficits
by allowing the spending of money that should have gone into the re-
ceipts baseline. Recent examples of this phenomenon are legion; they
include extensions of the 1990 Act increase in the gas tax,161 the 1990 Act
phaseout of personal exemptions, 162 and the limitation on itemized de-
ductions contained in the 1990 Budget Act.163
A variety of sensible proposals have been offered to make revenue
estimates more meaningful. For example, estimating the effect of pro-
posed changes on the present value of revenues collected from current
taxpayers might limit the likelihood that Congress could offer taxpayers
an overall tax reduction in exchange for accelerating their tax payments.
Jane Gravelle of the Congressional Research Service has recently pro-
posed "annuitizing" the revenue effects of alternative policy proposals to
159. Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-164,
§ 403, 105 Stat. 1049, 1062 (codified at 26 U.S.C. 6654 (1991).
160. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 712, 108 Stat. 4869,
4999-5001 (1994) (amending 26 U.S.C. §§ 5061, 5703, 6302).
161. See OBRA 93, supra note 6, at § 13241 (a). The § 13241 (a) tax of 6.8€ reflects a
continuation of the 1990 nickel tax, half of which (i.e. 2.50) was to be used for deficit
reduction, and half of which was to be used for the Highway Trust Fund. The 1993 Act
added 4.30 to the 2.90 used for deficit reduction, for a total of 6.8¢.
162. See OBRA 90, supra note 5, at § 11104.
163. See id. at § 11103.
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facilitate more appropriate comparisons of alternative proposals.' 64 This
approach would convert any tax proposal, regardless of its effects on the
federal government's cash flow, into the equivalent of an annuity, thereby
putting proposals with different cash patterns on an equal footing. The
Gravelle proposal would treat tax provisions in a manner more consistent
with the budgetary treatment of government loans after the 1990 Budget
Act.
To be sure, both of these suggestions offer potential improvements
in the process and could be coupled with providing ranges of revenue
estimates and classifying estimates according to their likely reliability. 165
Moreover, by supplying decisionmakers with complex additional numeri-
cal information and, at the same time, by identifying uncertainties in the
numbers provided to them, lawmakers would be hindered in their ability
to tie legislative decisions to easy summations of revenue estimates.
But we should not be overconfident about the ability to specify pro-
cedures that will make revenue estimates routinely reliable or meaning-
ful. Alan Auerbach, in a recent examination of the U.S. fiscal situation,
has shown that a combination of "technical" and "economic" forecasting
errors have, over a long period of time, made receipts forecasts exces-
sively optimistic. Auerbach has found that CBO projections of receipts in
the final year of its annual five-year forecasts have been substantially
greater than those that occurred and that deficit forecasts "have proved
very inaccurate and overly optimistic."1 66 Moreover, there are multiple
dimensions of budget and fiscal policy that would change the answers
that may be considered important. For example, suggestions have been
advanced to move from cash accounting to capital budgeting, to look to
the full employment deficit rather than the current cash deficit, and to
use inter-generational accounting as a substitute for deficit accounting. 167
Whatever the scorekeeping rules, however, opportunistic and creative
legislators and their staff will work within and around them, structuring
proposals to maximize the likelihood of outcomes they desire.
To be sure, legislators need to be aware generally of the size and
direction of revenue effects of proposals under consideration and of en-
actments. But permitting uncertain and frequently meaningless revenue
estimates to serve as a straightacket on policy outcomes, as they have in
the past decade, inhibits thoughtful tax policymaking and undermines
public respect for both the laws that result and the lawmakers that enact
them.
164. See Gravelle, supra note 155, at 490-94; see also R.A. Zaldivar, Panel Spends $1.9
Million in Futile Quest for Benefit Reforms, Phila. Enquirer, Dec. 15, 1994, at A16
(suggestion by Senator Bob Kerry to project deficit effects over a 30-year period).
165. See supra text accompanying note 133.
166. See Alan J. Auerbach, The U.S. Fiscal Problem: Where Are We, How We Got
Here and Where We're Going, Working Paper No. 4709 (National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1994).
167. See Auerbach, supra note 95.
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CONCLUSION
It seems impossibly difficult to communicate even the simplest facts
about tax and fiscal policy to the American public. One cannot be en-
tirely certain whether this is because politicians are engaged in willful
distortions, because the politicians themselves simply do not know the
facts or are misinformed, or because, as I have demonstrated here, the
truth in matters of this sort is at best elusive, and often unknowable. The
most recent important illustration of public confusion about fiscal "facts"
was the dispute over the proportion of tax increases and spending cuts in
the 1993 Act. A wide variety of estimates was offered as truth by opposing
politicians. Indeed, even the experts had difficulty in sorting through the
data.168 Much of the difficulty in this particular debate stemmed from
routine staff practices. For example, CBO's normal budgetary treatment
of user charges as "negative outlays" rather than as taxes no doubt en-
couraged the Clinton Administration to extend this notion by counting
as spending reductions income tax increases on Social Security benefits.
As the- analysis above makes clear, distributional facts are subject to simi-
lar debate and misunderstanding.
Moreover, the precision of distribution tables is itself illusory even if
they could be readily understood. Even the least disputable distributional
estimates are, as Boris Bittker would put it, somewhat fanciful. 169 It is
natural, for example, to read Table 1 to imply that the provisions of the
1993 Budget Act will change the average tax rate on people with $40 -
$50,000 of income from 20.9% to 21.19%. But as this Article has demon-
strated, this is an erroneous reading of the table itself and, in any event,
suggests far more precision than is plausible. The footnotes to the table
make clear that the interpretation of the foregoing sentence is wrong
despite the appearance of the table,170 and the discussion above makes it
clear that one should not attempt to connect these two numbers since the
first is an estimate of the relationship of taxes to income while the second
is derived from mistakenly adding an estimate of changes in "burden" to
an estimate of taxes. 171
Unfortunately, the answers to distributional questions provided by
these kinds of tables are probably most accurate (or, more precisely, least
inaccurate) when they are of least interest, namely, when the change is
narrowly targeted or very small. To know the distributional effects of sig-
nificant changes in tax policy on after-tax incomes, for example, we
would have to know the effect of both the tax increase (or decrease) and
any accompanying spending increases (decreases) and/or borrowing or
168. JCT Differs from White House in Revenue Estimates of Rate Hikes, International
Enforcement, Other Provisions, Mar. 4, 1993; see also Bentsen Sought 30 Revenue
Estimates for Bill, Tax Notes Today, Feb. 16, 1993 [both available in LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, TNT File.]
169. See Bittker, supra note 79, at 780.
170. See supra Table 1, note 4.
171. See text accompanying notes 52-26.
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other tax decreases (increases) on relative prices as well as on the employ-
ment, consumption, savings, wages, interest, rents, and profits of the peo-
ple whose change in distributional burdens is being assessed. When the
changes in these relevant variables are likely small, their distributional
effects may well be negligible and any "errors" reasonably, if not safely,
disregarded. Likewise, the choice between distributing only the static rev-
enue effects (JCT's proxy for "burden") and the total revenue effects is
not important when the effect of the tax change on peoples' behavior is
small. But when the tax changes and their likely consequences on behav-
ior are large, confidence in the "truth" of quantitative estimates of
distributional consequences diminishes. As I have demonstrated, neces-
sary simplifying assumptions are commonplace, but they are very
controversial.
My concerns expressed here should not be taken to imply that I be-
lieve distributional or revenue information to be unimportant or that
policymakers should not be informed of the distributional or revenue
consequences of their proposed actions. It is crucial, however, to distin-
guish the beneficial effects of academic, private, and staff analyses of such
information in an effort to understand better the existing state of affairs
or proposals for change to be considered in the future from the dangers
of such information presented to policymakers in the form of supposedly
definitive distributional tables at the time legislative decisions are being
made. My principal thesis is that distributional information is far too im-
portant to be left to distributional tables. The information transmitted to
policymakers through the current practice of producing distributional ta-
bles is simply bad information. Typically, it is both too much information
and too little. Distributional tables not only are overly precise, but they
also leave out important distributional matters. They completely conceal
important differences among the families grouped together in one distri-
butional classification. Distributional tables do not, for example, show
how different age cohorts, types of families or regions of the country will
be benefitted or burdened by tax changes. Indeed, distributional tables
bury such information along with many other issues discussed in this
Article. I
The current use of revenue estimates is, if anything, even more
troubling. Protected by supposed budget scorekeeping safeguards, policy
proposals are manipulated to produce revenue results in a five-year
budget window when the longer-term revenue consequences are known
to be quite different from that within the budget window. The process
should be revised to make explicit long-run comparisons of the budgetary
effects of proposals in an effort to make legislators accountable for the
long-term consequences of their decisions. Moreover, a range of esti-
mated revenue effects should be given to Congress and the Administra-
tion. Unfortunately, Congress may-at least in one important respect-
be moving in the opposite direction, tying a proposed constitutional
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amendment requiring a balanced budget to annual estimates of receipts
and outlays.172
People seriously concerned with the tax policymaking process have
reason to worry that the current use of both distributional tables and rev-
enue estimates in tax policymaking may prove extremely costly to sensible
tax policy. To take only one recent example, the substantial increases in
the marriage penalties under the 1993 legislation occurred as a conse-
quence of an effort to make both revenue estimates and distributional
tables come out in a certain manner. The current emphasis on distribu-
tional tables and revenue estimates tends both to reify staff decisions
about controversial matters and to tie legislators' hands in making consid-
ered policy judgments. Many thoughtful observers of the tax legislative
process, including a Chief of Staff ofJCT, have vigorously lamented the
dominant role now being played in the tax legislative process by revenue
estimates. 173 There is a serious danger that distributional tables play an
equally negative role. Indeed, some thoughtful observers believe this was
the case in 1990. If current practices in constructing and using distribu-
tional tables had been in vogue then, they might well have stymied the
1986 tax reform process, although the overwhelming commitment of the'
relevant staffs to the substance of that legislation more likely would have
induced them to put aside their "standard" practices for more creative
uses of data to make sure that this did not happen.
In my view, the distributional tables now presented to members of
Congress and other tax policymakers while legislation is being considered
should be abandoned. Congress would be far better served if the relevant
staffs coupled a verbal description of the overall distributional conse-
quences of legislation under consideration (with doubts, controversial as-
sumptions, and uncertainties of the sort detailed in this Article explicitly
identified and discussed) with staff-produced examples of how the legisla-
tion under consideration would affect the taxes of specific examples of
typical families. If a legislator were interested in a particular circum-
stance, examples could be readily produced with added facts, distinguish-
ing, for example, taxpayers over 65 from younger families or couples
where both spouses work from those with only one employed spouse.
Both the qualitative information and the examples of how various fami-
lies would be affected by the legislation generally would be noncontrover-
sial among the staffs, and any significant disagreements among the staffs
could be discussed in the presence of the decisionmakers. When offset-
ting tax increases or decreases are considered necessary for distributional
reasons, staffs might also indicate their rough magnitudes. Indeed, staffs
might wish to refer for their own discussion to analyses of the sort they
now make available to decisionmakers but with greater consideration of
ambiguities, disputes and uncertainties of the sort I have detailed here.
172. See Taylor, supra note 153, at 358.
173. See Gutman, supra note 132.
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As examples of the kinds of qualitative distributional information I envi-
sion, the relevant staffs should inform members of Congress that substitu-
tion of a value-added tax for the income tax would reduce taxes for high-
income families, but that this effect would be smaller if a longer time
perspective-perhaps even a lifetime perspective-were taken; that inte-
gration of the corporate tax would be a tax reduction for higher income
people to the extent that the incidence of the tax is now on owners of
capital, but less so to the extent the corporate tax is borne by labor or
consumers. Likewise, the staff should inform decisionmakers that a
tobacco tax increase would be borne largely by younger low- and middle-
income people and is regressive when viewed vis-a-vis annual income but
perhaps proportional on a lifetime basis. The ongoing production of
new distributional tables for policy alternatives should come to a halt.
No doubt, the views I am expressing here will be regarded by those
who produce such data and perhaps by the economics profession at large
as an effort to deprive legislators of the best data that economic science
can now produce, given the time constraints that the legislative timetable
demands. So be it. Ronald Coase, the Nobel Laureate in Economics,
once remarked, "In my youth it was said that what was too silly to be said
may be sung. In modem economics it may be put into mathematics." 174
In an even less charitable moment, he observed: "If you torture the data
enough, nature will always confess."175
ADDENDUM
On March 23, 1995, after this Article went to press, the Wall Street
Journal reported that the Treasury Department (OTA) and the Joint
Committee on Taxation (JCT) made substantial changes in their method-
ologies for distributing benefits of tax reductions advanced by the new
Republican House of Representatives majority.17 6 Both OTA andJCT re-
versed their positions on distributing changes in taxes versus changes in
burdens for proposed capital gains tax rate reductions. OTA distributed
the static revenue cost of the change as an estimate of the change in tax
burdens (JCT's prior practice) andJCT distributed the actual anticipated
change in taxes (OTA's prior practice). 77 JCT also abandoned its prior
practice of allocating changes in corporate taxes to owners of capital and
instead did not include any of the benefits of corporate tax reductions in
its distribution tables.' 78JCT distributed tax reductions for the year 2000;
174. Ronald H. Coase, The Firm, the Market and the Law 185 (1988).
175. Ronald H. Coase, How Should Economists Choose? 16 (1982); see also Michael
A. Fitts, Can Ignorance be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence in Political
Institutions, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 917, 917-82 (1990).
176. Lucinda Harper, Treasury, Congress Disagree How Much GOP's Gains-Tax Cut
Benefits the Rich, Wall St. J., March 23, 1995, at A2.
177. See supra Part II.C.1.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 73-80.
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OTA continued to distribute tax changes as fully phased-in. 179 As the
Wall Street Journal accurately reported, "The result: The Treasury's
changes make the Republican tax-cut bill look extremely generous to the
rich. Changes by the congressional Joint Committee on Taxation make
the same tax cuts look less generous to the wealthy."' 80
These methodological changes should shake anyone's remaining
confidence that the various staffs' distributional tables discussed in this
Article are-or even can be-driven by economic science rather than by
politics. The mystery deepens as to why these distributional tables should
be used to determine tax legislative outcomes.
I rest my case.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 70-73.
180. Harper, supra note 176, at A2.
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